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Introduction

I.

Employment-related geographic mobility encompasses a wide range of situations, ranging from
workers who travel extensively for work, workers who make a daily commute of two to three
hours or more, workers who commute across the country on a periodic basis and for extended
periods of time, and workers who travel internationally for work in or out of Canada. Each one
of these situations may pose a challenge to the ability of workers to establish and sustain an
effective collective bargaining relationship with their employer because of the mismatch
between their reality and the design and operation of Canada’s collective bargaining laws. As
well, collective bargaining itself may become a driver of E-RGM to the extent that it imposes
restrictions on access to employment or mobility within a workplace that result in workers
moving for work. The purpose of this report is to provide researchers with an understanding of
these problems, focusing primarily on workers who commute and on workers who change jobs
and employers as a result of their geographic mobility. It also provides a separate discussion of
temporary foreign workers (TFWs) in Canada. As such, the report does not present a
comprehensive and detailed legal analysis, but rather a broader survey that identifies and
explains where problems may arise for these workers and why.
For the purposes of this research we conducted a review of legislation, case law and secondary
literature. With respect to legislation, we started by scanning the 2013 consolidation of the
Ontario Labour Relations Act (OLRA) 1 to identify provisions that we thought might be of
particular significance to geographically mobile workers. We then searched labour board
decisions from all Canadian jurisdictions without time restrictions to identify cases in which ERGM was an issue in the interpretation and application of labour statutes. In addition to
identifying issues, we also hoped that this would draw our attention to statutory provisions in
other province labour relations statutes that were problematic for geographically mobile
workers. Next, we turned to arbitration awards from across Canada to identify grievances in
which E-RGM was an issue. At the same time, we examined the secondary literature, including
labour law and arbitration texts and academic books, book chapters and journals for discussions
of any problems relating to E-RGM and collective bargaining. To our surprise, apart from the
issue of temporary foreign workers, these searches yielded very little. In order to make sure we
had missed any important issues, we consulted with a small number of trade union officials at
the beginning of the research project and circulated a draft of this report for comment to other
researchers and trade union researchers.
1

Labour Relations Act, 1995, S.O. 1995, c. 1, Schedule A.
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We cannot fully explain the paucity of case law and commentary on E-RGM and collective
bargaining. In part this may reflect the fact that geographic mobility has been less of an issue in
the past than it is at present, but it would be wrong to assume that it is a new phenomenon.
International and domestic labour migration has been a widespread phenomenon for centuries.
Indeed, as we shall see, in an industry where mobility has been the norm, the construction
industry, mechanisms have been developed to address this situation, and they will be described
in more detail in the report. Whatever the reason for the lack of attention, it has made our task
more difficult. Not only is there little analysis of the issues, but for the most part issues have not
even been identified. Thus in many ways this report is a first-look at the intersection of E-RGM
and collective bargaining law and we have tried to identify research questions that require
fieldwork to answer.
The analysis that follows is organized in the following manner. Part II identifies structural
features of Canadian collective bargaining law that are, if not incompatible with, then at least illsuited to E-RGM. These structures include the limited regulatory role that unions play in our
collective bargaining regime, the provincial basis of collective bargaining law resulting from the
constitutional division of powers, and the difficulties of obtaining union representation for
workers generally. These features of Canadian collective bargaining law become particularly
problematic when E-RGM involves workers changing jobs or workplaces because they have left
one location and moved to another. Part III then examines in more detail particular issues that
may arise when geographically mobile workers need to become incorporated into the collective
bargaining regime because they have moved into a non-union job or need to be re-incorporated
into the regime because they have moved into a unionized workplace . Part IV briefly addresses
the question of how the collective bargaining regime operates for geographically mobile workers
who are remain within a bargaining unit but have special needs because of their geographic
mobility. A separate section, Part V. is devoted to the problem of temporary foreign workers
(TFWs) and collective bargaining since their precarious immigration status creates special
vulnerabilities that are not shared by persons with permanent status in Canada.

II.

Structural Features of the Canadian Collective Bargaining Regime
As we noted above, the basic structures of Canadian collective bargaining law produce obstacles
for all Canadian workers to establish effective collective voice, but these obstacles are
particularly severe for mobile workers generally and geographically mobile workers in
particular. In this part of the report, we discuss three such structures: 1) Canadian unions have
3

a weak regulatory function; 2) it is generally difficult to obtain union representation; and 3)
there are no national labour laws.
A. Representational versus Regulatory Collective Bargaining
Trade unions can and do function in a variety of ways. Keith Ewing usefully identified five
functions of trade union: 1) service; 2) representation; 3) regulatory; 4) government and 5)
public administration. 2 For our purposes, we focus on, and compare and contrast, regulatory
systems of collective bargaining with representational systems. In regulatory systems, unions
participate in rule-making processes that establish terms and conditions of employment on a
sectoral basis. This may be done in a variety of ways but typically it involves a union or a council
of unions bargaining with a council of employers. The agreement that is reached applies to all
employers in the sector even if they are not parties to the agreement. As a consequence, the
terms and conditions of employment for all workers in the sector are set by the agreement,
whether or not they are members of the trade union or trade unions that negotiated the
agreement. For the most part, this is not the model of collective bargaining that prevails in
Canada, although weak forms of regulatory unionism exist in Canada, such as under collective
agreement extension legislation in some provinces (now mostly defunct) 3 and in some sectors of
the construction industry. For this and for other reasons, construction will receive separate
treatment in this report.
Instead, in Canada we mostly have representational systems of collective bargaining. The
fundamental principle of representational collective bargaining is that unions only negotiate
terms and conditions of employment for members of the bargaining units they have been
certified (or voluntarily recognized by the employer) to represent. Workers who are not in
certified bargaining units are not covered by collective agreements and it follows that employers
whose workers are not unionized and who are not parties to a collective agreement are not
bound by collective agreements that apply to other employers in the same sector. It is essential,
therefore, that workers unionize (bargaining unit by bargaining unit) in order for their terms
and conditions to be established by collective bargaining and that unions gain representation
rights in order for them to be able to fulfill their function. This model has very significant

2Keith

Ewing, “The Function of Trade Unions” (2005) 34 Industrial Law Journal 1.
Mélanie Laroche and Gregor Murray, “Coordinated Employer Bargaining and Globalisation: A Study of
the Men’s Clothing Industry in Quebec, 1974-2012” (2012) 43 Industrial Relations Journal 472.
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implications for collective bargaining coverage, as is demonstrated by the following chart, which
depicts union density and collective bargaining coverage in 21 wealthy countries. 4
Figure 1

Union Membership and Union Coverage for 21 Wealthy Countries

In countries like Canada and the United States, where unions play a representational role,
collective bargaining coverage and union density are closely aligned, whereas in countries where
unions serve a regulatory role, such as France and Spain, collective bargaining coverage is vastly
greater than actual union membership.
The representational character of Canadian collective bargaining is so fundamental and deeply
engrained as part of our industrial relations common sense that it might not seem necessary to
From John Schmitt and Alexandra Mitukiewicz, “Politics Matter: Changes in Unionization Rates in Rich
Countries, 1960-2010” (November 2011: Center for Economic Policy Research), 5 available online
http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/unions-oecd-2011-11.pdf.
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mention it. However, its implications for E-RGM are profound. In a system of regulatory
unionism, geographic mobility presents fewer challenges. The principal reason is that collective
bargaining coverage is likely to be significantly higher. In the strongest version of regulatory
unionism, each sector of the economy would be covered by a national agreement setting terms
and conditions of employment for all workers employed in that sector. Therefore, if a worker
moved from one province to another or from one region to another, she would remain covered
by a collective bargaining agreement, even if the move involved a change of employer. Of
course not all problems would be resolved as there would still have to be rules about the transfer
of seniority and other such matters, but these would be second order issues.
However, this is not our reality and so we have to recognize and confront the difficulties that a
representational model poses for mobile workers generally, including geographically mobile
workers. First, in representational models of collective bargaining union density is typically
lower; unions must win representation rights, bargaining unit by bargaining unit, and, as will be
discussed briefly below, this is hard work. Because densities are lower, there is a greater
likelihood that geographically mobile workers who are changing jobs are moving from one nonunionized job to another or that if they are leaving a unionized job they will be moving to a nonunionized job. In order to gain access to collective bargaining, therefore, their new workplaces
will have to become unionized. Second, in representational models the coverage of a collective
agreement is likely to be quite narrow. Indeed, as will be discussed below, the Canadian model
is extremely fragmented, so that typically a bargaining unit is no larger than all the employees of
a particular employer in a particular municipality. As a result, even if a worker moves from one
unionized job to another that worker is going to be covered by a different collective agreement
and is unlikely to carry over seniority acquired at their previous job. Given the importance of
seniority in unionized environments, this can leave mobile workers more vulnerable to lay-offs
and disadvantaged when it comes to transfers or other seniority-based rights. Again, as we shall
see, some unions, most notably in the construction industry, have tried to address this problem
through collective bargaining or membership rules. 5
It is perhaps misleading to construct a strict dichotomy between regulatory and representational
collective bargaining when in principle and practice there is a continuum between the two. For
example, regulatory unionism may operate on a narrower geographic or occupational basis than
The problem of loss of seniority when moving from one bargaining unit to another is not unique to
geographic mobility. It affects all workers who change employers, even if they remain within the same
municipality. But it is a problem that geographically mobile workers will regularly encounter.

5
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the one we have described. Similarly, the scope of representational collective bargaining can
also vary. For example, in principle we could have a certified bargaining unit that covers all
employees of a particular employer across the country or a multi-employer bargaining unit.
Clearly, as the size of bargaining units increases under representational unionism and the scope
of agreements in regulatory unionism decreases, the differences between the two regimes
diminish. But as we shall see below, because Canada embraces an extremely fragmented model
of representational collective bargaining in most sectors, the difference between the regimes is
pronounced.
B. Canada’s Fragmented Collective Bargaining Regime
As a federal state, legislative jurisdiction is divided between the federal government and the
provinces. At the time of Confederation, labour relations simply did not exist as a discrete topic
and so no explicit allocation of authority was made. In fact, the question of constitutional
authority really did not arise until the early decades of the twentieth century when, in response
to growing concern about the impact of industrial conflict on the national economy, the federal
government enacted the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act in 1907. 6 Although its application
was limited to industries that were thought to have significance for the national economy, such
as railways and mines, it also applied to municipalities and it was this extension that produced
the legal challenge to the federal government’s constitutional authority to legislate in the area of
labour relations. The majority of Canadian judges who heard the case supported federal
jurisdiction, but the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, then the highest court of appeal for
Canada, took the view that labour relations were a matter of property and civil rights and thus
primarily within provincial jurisdiction. 7 As a result, each province and territory has its own
labour laws and the federal government’s laws only apply to those areas over which it has
constitutional authority, such as inter-provincial railways, airlines, telecommunications,
banking, etc., comprising about 10% of the labour force.
This structure has important implications for workers outside of the federal jurisdiction who
travel from one province to another for the purposes of employment. Conceptually, the largest
possible bargaining unit of a provincially regulated employer is all employees employed in the
province. Of course, as we shall see, bargaining units are much more fragmented than that, but
S.C. 1907, c.20.
Electric Commissioners v. Snider [1925] AC 396 (P.C.). Discussed in Blake Brown and Jennifer
Llewellyn, “‘Capitalist ‘justice’ as peddled by the ‘Noble Lords’: Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider
et al,” in Eric Tucker and Judge Fudge, eds.,Work on Trial: Cases in Context(Toronto: Irwin and the
Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 2010), 15-42.

6
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leaving further fragmentation aside, the implication of provincial jurisdiction is that, for
collective bargaining purposes, geographically mobile workers cannot move seamlessly from one
province to another. Even if they are unionized in their prior job, when a worker moves to a
different province she must leave her bargaining unit and become re-incorporated into a
different bargaining unit in order to remain unionized and be covered by a collective bargaining
agreement. That reincorporation may be relatively straightforward if the worker moves into
another unionized job (subject to the loss of seniority), or it may require the organization of a
new bargaining unit if the new job is in a non-union workplace.
Within a province, labour relations boards are tasked with determining what constitutes an
appropriate bargaining unit, within fairly broad legislative parameters. For example, collective
bargaining statutes will typically prohibit one-person or multi-employer bargaining units,
particularly in the industrial union context. 8 The most common criteria used by labour boards
for assessing the appropriateness of a bargaining unit is whether a group of workers share a
“community of interest” and whether a proposed unit will cause significant industrial relations
problems for the employer. A variety of factors have been posited as being relevant to this
determination, which Adams examines in detail. These include:
1) History of collective bargaining in the industry, geographical area or particular
employer;
2) Similarity in skills, interest, duties and working conditions;
3) Nature of the employer’s organization – does the community of interest parallel the
company’s internal organization?
4) Wishes of the parties, constrained by policy considerations. 9
Despite the stated intention of labour relations boards to minimize bargaining unit
fragmentation, in practice the application of these factors generally leads to a very fragmented
bargaining structure. There is, however, considerable variation in approaches taken by labour
boards in different provinces and in different industries. For example, in Ontario, the norm is
all the employees of a particular employer in a particular municipality, but exceptions are made
in some circumstances. In contrast, the approach in British Columbia tends to favour broader
units incorporating all employees of an employer within the province. However, there are
exceptions. 10 The upshot of this structure is that, depending on the province, there is a high

For example, in Ontario the statute expressly prohibits one person bargaining units and by implication
excludes multi-employer units by defining a bargaining unit as “a unit of employees appropriate for
collective bargaining, whether it is an employer unit or a plant unit or a subdivision of either of them.”
S.O. 1995, c. 1, Sch. A, ss. 1 & 9(1).
9George Adams, Canadian Labour Law, 2d ed., (Aurora, ON: Canada Law Book, looseleaf) at 7.120-7.262.
10 Adam, ibid, 7.270 et seq.
8
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likelihood that even when a geographically mobile unionized employee moves from one job to
another within the same province, she will leave her bargaining unit and need to become reincorporated into the collective bargaining regime either by moving into a unionized job covered
by a different collective agreement or by organizing a new bargaining unit if the new job is nonunion.
Of course, the legal determination of appropriate bargaining units does not prevent a union and
an employer or group of employers from agreeing to bargain on a different basis, potentially
producing a national or a province-wide agreement. But if the employer refuses to negotiate on
a broader basis than the appropriate bargaining unit as defined by the labour board, the union
cannot legally force it to do so and, indeed, may be found to have breached its duty to bargain in
good faith if it insists on a different bargaining configuration. While broader-based bargaining
was sometimes practiced in Canada, most employers have pulled out of such arrangements. 11
C. The Acquisition of Union Representation under Canadian Labour Law
As we noted, in our model of representational collective bargaining, workers must opt into
union representation in order to move from the individual contract of employment regime to the
collective bargaining regime. This can happen by an employer voluntarily recognizing the
union, but this is relatively uncommon in Canada and so we will focus primarily on certification
procedures. Unions gain representation rights by becoming the certified bargaining agent of a
group of workers defined as an appropriate bargaining unit (discussed above). Generally
speaking, a union becomes certified by establishing to the satisfaction of the labour board that it
enjoys majority support among the employees in the bargaining unit it seeks to represent. In
some provinces and territories 12, this can be accomplished by getting a majority (50% + 1) or
super-majority (e.g., 55% + 1) of the employees in the bargaining unit to sign union membership
cards. In other provinces, unions must first sign up a defined percentage of the bargaining unit
as members (e.g., 40%) in order to qualify for an election and then they must obtain a majority
of the votes cast in the election in order to become the certified bargaining agent. 13
There is a substantial body of research that shows that it is harder for unions to succeed under a
mandatory election law. This is because under an election regime employers have a greater
11 Anne Forrest, “The Rise and Fall of National Bargaining in the Canadian Meat-Packing Industry” (1989)
44 Relations Industrielles 393.
12Quebec, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, Manitoba, Prince Edward Island, Northwest
Territories, Yukon, Nunavut and in federal industries.
13British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Ontario, and Nova Scotia.
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opportunity to exercise their right under collective bargaining statutes to express their
opposition to unionization, provided that they do not abuse their power by committing an unfair
labour practice. 14 Unfair labour practices include retaliating against union supporters by, for
example, firing them, or using threats or intimidation to deter workers from expressing their
true wishes about union representation. These rules apply to all organizing drives. We will
return later to discuss particular problems that geographically mobile workers may face in the
operation of this model.

(Re-)Incorporating Geographically Mobile Workers into Collective

III.

Bargaining
The Canadian model of collective bargaining produces a situation in which geographically
mobile workers will often need to be (re-)incorporated into collective bargaining if their
movement involves leaving one job and taking another. If they are not (re)incorporated then
their employment relation will be governed by the individual contract of employment regime. It
will be helpful at the outset to conceptually map out a number of different scenarios that may
arise when geographic mobility entails a change of jobs, based on whether the job they are
leaving and the job they are moving into is unionized or not. This produces a matrix of four
scenarios. In Figure 2 we have identified for each scenario what we anticipate to be the primary
issue faced by mobile workers in being(re) incorporated into the collective bargaining regime 15:
Figure 2

Principal Problems Incorporating Geographically Mobile Workers into Collective
Bargaining Based on Union Status of Previous and Destination Workplace

Status of
Previous

Workplace

Unionized

Non-Unionized

1.Organizing

3. Accretion/Carry-

Problems

over of seniority

2. Organizing

4. Accretion

Problems

Susan Johnson, “Card Check or Mandatory Representation Vote?: How the Type of Union Recognition
Procedure Affects Union Certification Success” (2002) 111 Economic Journal 344; Chris Riddell, “Union
Certification Success Under Voting Versus Card-Check Procedures: Evidence from British Columbia,
1978-1998” (2004) 57 Industrial and Labor Relations Review 493; Sara Slinn “Empirical Analysis of the
Effects of the Change from Card-Check to Mandatory Vote Certification” (2004) 11 Canadian Labour and
Employment Law Journal 259.
15While the scenarios apply to all mobile workers, not just geographically mobile workers, this does not
diminish their significance for these workers.
14
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Non-Unionized

Unionized

Figure 1
Status
of Destination Workplace
Figure 2

Our first two scenarios are of mobile workers, whether unionized or not, moving to work in nonunionized work places. Basic intuition dictates that because there is no collective bargaining
unit to begin with the primary obstacle will be organizing a union in the new workplace. As we
noted earlier, organizing is always hard work, but we will examine more closely the particular
difficulties for organizing geographically mobile workers.
The third scenario is where unionized workers move from one unionized job to another. Here
the issue is not whether the mobile employee will be covered by a collective agreement, but
whether they will carry-over any seniority rights from their prior unionized workplace. There
are a number of variations on this scenario that will be explored in more detail, but as we shall
see, in most instances the answer to this question is not determined by statute but rather
depends on the terms of collective agreements and/or internal trade union rules. So the focus
here is on incorporating mobile workers into collective bargaining agreements.
A fourth scenario identified in Figure 2 is when a non-unionized worker moves to a unionized
workplace (or a unionized worker moves to a unionized workplace represented by a different
union). In that situation, the worker will become a member of the bargaining unit at the new
workplace (without seniority) and be represented by the incumbent union, provided that the
new job is within the bargaining unit and covered by the recognition clause of the collective
agreement. This is known as accretion. 16
A. Organizing Problems: Incorporating Geographically Mobile Workers
into Collective Bargaining
Our focus here is on problems that arise in organizing mobile workers so that they can
successfully become certified in a new bargaining unit and gain union representation. In the
previous section we briefly described the Canadian certification model, which requires proof of
majority support either by card counts in the jurisdictions where they are permitted or on

16

Ibid at 7.780 et seq.
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elections. In either case, organizing is not easy, but it is the special obstacles faced by
geographically mobile workers that are our concern here.
1. Who is an Employee/Who is the Employer
Collective bargaining legislation regulates relations between employers and employees.
Therefore, before mobile workers can be incorporated into the collective bargaining regime they
must be legally classified as employees. The topic of who is an employee for the purposes of
collective bargaining 17 is too large a topic to be addressed here, but generally speaking labour
boards have adopted multi-factor tests that look to control, ownership of tools and chance of
profit and risk of loss in order to ascertain whether a person is an independent contractor
running a business or an employee. 18 Because there is not a bright line, judgments must be
made at the margin and in many jurisdictions 19 labour legislation provides that “dependent
contractors” are employees for the purposes of the act. We are unaware of case law where the
status of mobile workers has been in play or of studies of mobile workers where this question
has come up. Are geographically mobile workers more likely than others to find themselves in
positions where they are being cast as independent contractors or where the characteristics of
their relationships are markedly different from others? We don’t know. 20 However,
fieldworkers should be aware of this issue and we would be pleased to provide more support or
advice if it does arise.
If there is an employee, then by definition there must be an entity that is legally responsible for
the obligations of the employer. This formulation is, perhaps, awkward but necessary. Since the
nineteenth century, employment was understood as a contractual relationship between an
employee and an employer. Since the late-twentieth century, the situation is more complex.
Judges and administrative decision-makers are no longer wedded to a contractual model and in
some instances will hold an entity to be responsible for the obligations of an employer for the
purposes of the common law or statute even in the absence of a contractual relationship.
Moreover, in some instances different entities can be recognized as the employer for different
It should be noted that workers can be employees for some purposes but not others. Because of
dependent contractor provisions in many labour relations statutes, the definition of employee for the
purposes of collective bargaining is often broader than it is for other purposes, such as employment
standards protection.
18 Adams, 6.440 et seq.
19 Adams, 6.10 et seq.
20 While MacDonald does not address the specific question of geographic mobility and employment
status precariousness, she does speak more generally of the ways in which geographic mobility may
facilitate precariousness. See Martha MacDonald, “Spatial Dimensions of Gendered Precariousness:
Challenges for Comparative Analysis” in Leah F. Vosko, Martha MacDonald and Iain Campbell, eds.,
Gender and the Contours of Precarious Employment (London: Routledge, 2009), 220-22.
17
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purposes. Fortunately, we are only concerned with the question of who is the employer for the
purposes of collective bargaining law and so our enquiry can be narrowed.
The identification of the employer has become more problematic in recent decades because of a
phenomenon that David Weil has labeled “fissuring,” which involved companies moving work
outside of the firm through outsourcing and subcontracting. 21 So whereas in the past firms may
have hired their own employees to produce something, they are now more likely to contract out
all or part of the production process. Those contracted firms in turn may also sub-contract,
sometimes hiring a labour supply firm to be the employer of record. However, the designation
of an entity as the employer does not determine the question of whether the designated entity is
the legal employer. In the collective bargaining context, this is a matter to be determined by a
labour relations board, subject to judicial review if the court finds the board’s determination to
be unreasonable.
The problem of identifying who is the employer can arise in several different contexts. One area
where there has been controversy and confusion is when a company contracts with an agency for
temporary employees. The issue becomes legally complicated because the temporary employees
have a contractual relationship with the agency but not with the client firm where they provide
service. However, the client firm exercises substantial control over the performance of the work.
Labour boards have approached the issue by adopting the fundamental control test in which
they determine which of the two entities exercises the most control over the employees’ based on
a number of factors. 22 The application of this test has often resulted in the board finding that
the client is the employer. However, the existence of what is now called a triangular
employment relationship causes organizing problems regardless of whether the client or the
agency is the employer if only because the group of temporary employees is more likely to
fluctuate and have a more precarious relationship. 23 Another scenario is a subcontracting
relationship. Here the legal situation is clearer. As long as there is an arms-length relationship
between the contractor and the sub-contractor, there is little likelihood that the contractor will
be found to be the employee of the sub-contractor’s employees. However, the relationships can
become quite murky, in which case significant difficulties may arise. 24
David Weil, The Fissured Workplace (Boston: Harvard University, 2014).
York Condominium Corporation, [1977] OLRB Rep. 645.
23 These issues are explored at length in Timothy J. Bartkiw, “Unions and Temporary Help Agency
Employment” (2012) 67 Relations Industrielles 453.
24 For example, see Lockerbie Management Ltd. and IBEW, Local 254 (Re), (1989), 2 C.L.R.B.R. (2d)
308, 1989 CLB 11833 (Alta.). For discussion see, Adams, 6.440 et seq.
21

22
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We are aware of only one case in which the problem of who is the employer of a group of
geographically mobile workers has been considered and that was in relation to a group of TFWs
brought to Canada on an intra-company transfer. In that case, CW Wind Canada was a
subsidiary of CS Wind, which had its headquarters in Korea. It manufactures wind towers. This
requires highly skilled and specialized labour, which was not available in Canada and so
Vietnamese workers, employed by CS Wind Vietnam, were brought in through the TFW
program to assist in the training of new CS Wind Canada employees and to perform the work
until there were enough domestic workers. An organizing drive of the permanent domestic
workers was conducted by the International Association of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental and
Reinforcing Ironworkers, Local 721. The employer objected to the union’s proposed bargaining
unit (see discussion infra.), which in turn raised the issue of who was the employer for the
purposes of collective bargaining, CS Wind Canada or CS Wind Vietnam. In answering this
question, the board first reviewed the test for determining employer status and moved away
from the York Condominium test most commonly used toward a more comprehensive factoring
test to determine which party has the most control over all aspects of the work on the specific
facts of each case. 25 Despite the fact that in this case the TFWs had signed contracts of
employment with the Vietnamese company that established many of their terms and conditions,
the board concluded that the Canadian employer exercised day to day control over the working
lives of the Vietnamese TFWs and on that basis held that CS Wind Canada was the employer.
The result is consistent with outcomes of domestic cases involving triangular employment
relations and so it is quite likely that in most instances the employer of mobile workers will be
the employer who controls the worksite.
That said, as we noted, we have found only one case on point and we are not aware of any
secondary literature which has discussed this issue. As with the case of determining employee
status, we need to know more about the reality of geographically mobile workers’ situations.
We would be happy to provide further advice in the event workers in the field discover that the
identification of the employer is a problem that geographically mobile workers are experiencing.

25 International Association of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental and Reinforcing Ironworkers, Local 721
v CS Wind Canada Inc, 2014 CanLII 14887 (ON LRB), para. 99 <http://canlii.ca/t/g6d7f> retrieved
on 2014-04-28. Frankly, we are dubious that the differences between the two tests are significant and
would lead to different results.
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2. Organizing Difficulties
Apart from questions of employee status and the identification of the employer, we might ask
more generally whether it is more difficult to organize a group of workers that includes
geographically mobile workers than one that does not. For the purposes of our discussion here
we bracket the situation of temporary foreign workers because of the particular problems posed
by their precarious immigration status. This group of workers will be considered separately in
another section. As in the previous section, we have not identified cases in which the particular
situation of mobile workers has come up as a factor in organizing, nor have we found this matter
discussed in the secondary literature. Thus much of what follows is speculative.
We begin with the question of bargaining unit determination. Here we start from the
assumption that there is no dispute that the geographically mobile workers are employees of the
employer that is being organized (see above). The question then is whether mobile workers,
including both workers who, for example, fly in and out for weeks at a time, are in the same
bargaining unit as workers as more permanent workers. To our knowledge, labour boards do
not have a practice of excluding mobile workers from a bargaining unit in this situation. For
example, in Ontario and Alberta seasonal and casual workers are generally not excluded from an
all-employee unit. 26
The fact that mobile workers are generally not separated out into a separate bargaining unit still
leaves the question of whether there are particular challenges in organizing them. The first step
in organizing is making contact with workers in the targeted bargaining unit. As a general
matter unions are not entitled to be given the names and contact information of the employees
in the bargaining unit they are trying to organize, unless the employer has already committed
unfair labour practices and disclosure has been ordered as a remedy. 27 In a large workplace with
multiple shifts and part-time workers, contacting employees can be a challenge. If we add to
this mix the presence of a group of mobile workers who are only intermittently present, or a
group of workers who spend several hours each day commuting to and from work, we
hypothesize that other things being equal the difficulties would only increase.

Jeffrey Sack, Michael Mitchell and Sandy Price, Ontario Labour Relations Board: Law and Practice,
3rd ed., (Markham, ON: Butterworths, 1997), 3.297 et seq.; Alberta Labour Relations Board, “Information
Bulletin # 9: Bargaining Unit Descriptions” (Revised March 13, 20098), online
http://www.alrb.gov.ab.ca/bulletins/9bulletin.html
27 Once a union has been certified as the collective bargaining agent, obtaining contact information of
union members becomes significantly easier, as the certified union’s representational duties
counterbalance privacy concerns: see Bernard v. Canada (2014) S.C.C. 14.
26
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The next step would be to convince the employees to become union members. There are many
factors that influence this decision and we cannot elaborate on this issue here. However, one
influential view is that workers weigh the potential benefits of signing a union card against the
possible risks, including employer retaliation. How might being a geographically mobile worker
affect one’s calculation of the benefits and costs? Given the variation among mobile workers,
there is no easy answer to this question. It might be hypothesized that transient workers would
expect to gain less from unionization because their attachment to the particular bargaining unit
might be less than that of more permanent workers 28, while the costs of joining a union would
be seen as being higher if they feel more vulnerable to suffering retaliation, such as not being
asked to return. 29 Of course unfair labour practice protection makes it illegal to threaten or
intimidate workers in order to deter them from choosing union representation, but employees
cannot assume that their rights will be vindicated. We emphasize, however, that this is simply a
hypothesis that requires field studies to be confirmed or refuted.
We next come to the question of determining who is in the bargaining unit either for the
purposes of determining whether the union has obtained the level of support it needs either to
trigger an election, win a card count certification where that is available or win an election.
When the workforce is more or less stable this is not a problem, but where there are mobile
workers this may become an issue. In most provinces, the answer is determined by who is in the
bargaining unit on the day the application for certification is made. Workers who leave before
that date or who arrive after do not count or get counted. There are two provinces, New
Brunswick and PEI, which follow a different practice and fix a terminal date 8-10 days after the
application is made. This arrangement would increase the ability of an employer to manipulate
the results by either increasing or decreasing the number of mobile workers, but we do not know
of any case where this allegation has been made, with either arrangement. 30 There is an
exception to the approach articulated above and that is when there is a real likelihood that there
will be a substantial increase in the size of the bargaining unit in the near future the board will
28 Although this is not necessarily true. For example, many mobile workers return regularly to the same
employer and expect to do so for an extended period of time. See Christine Laporte, Yuqian Lu and Grant
Schellenberg, “Inter-provincial Employees in Alberta” (Statistics Canada, Analytic Studies Branch
Research Paper Series, Catalogue No. 11FOO19M, no. 350, September 2013).
29 For example, one study found that the use of migrant labour in Canada benefitted employers by
allowing for the easy dismissal of such workers when their labour was no longer required and that Cape
Breton workers who commuted to the oil patch felt more vulnerable following the recession. See Nelson
Ferguson, “From Coal Pits to Tar Sands: Labour Migration between an Atlantic Canadian Region and the
Athabasca Oil Sands” (2011) 17 & 18 Just Labour 106.
30 Adams, 7.1080 et seq.
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postpone the election or the card count until the build-up is substantially complete. 31 However,
we do not see this as being a substantial concern for mobile workers.
Geographically mobile workers employed at remote locations may also experience barriers to
becoming unionized. One problem is that of access to the workers whose residences are located
on their employer’s private property, from which organizers can normally be excluded. Another
is that union organizers may face considerable difficulty getting to the worksite. Indeed, outside
union organizers may not even be able to reach the location without permission or authorization
as in the case of an offshore drilling platform. Some but not all labour relations statutes address
this problem by allowing the union to apply for a labour board order permitting organizer access
in this situation. 32 As well, in some situations, such as Newfoundland’s offshore oil industry,
interest in maintaining industrial peace resulted in special legislative provisions being made to
accommodate unionization in this difficult environment. 33 The Newfoundland statute goes into
detail about when it is appropriate to order access, requiring the Board to consider 1) the
impracticability of accessing employees off premises and 2) the necessity of access for the
purposes of organizing. It also allows the Board to make secondary orders governing access, as
well as orders requiring employers to provide union representatives with food and lodging while
they are on the employer’s premises. 34
Saskatchewan’s approach to this issue is, perhaps, unique in Canada. The Saskatchewan
Employment Act, 35 makes in an unfair labour practice for an employer (or anyone acting on
behalf of an employer) “to refuse, deny, restrict or limit the right of the employee or employees
to allow access to the premises by members of any union representing or seeking to represent
the employee or employees or any of them for the purpose of collective bargaining” “if one or
more employees are permitted or required to live in premises supplied by, or by arrangement
with, the employer.” Unlike other access provisions in other statutes, in Saskatchewan’s
legislation provides employees with a right to allow access to property for trade union
representatives. As well, unlike in other provinces, where the right of access only arises with a
direction from the Board, in Saskatchewan no board intervention is required. In other words,
Adams, 7.1860 et seq.
For example, see OLRA, s. 13 and RSBC 1996, c 244, s. 7. There is no access provision in Nova Scotia
and Alberta.
33 Sean Cadigan, “Organizing Offshore: Labour Relations, Industrial Pluralism and Order
in the Newfoundland and Labrador Oil Industry, 1997-2006” in Judy Fudge and Eric Tucker, eds., Work
on Trial (Toronto: Irwin , 2010 ), 143.
34 RSNL 1990 c L-1, s. 34.
35 SS 2014, c S-15.1.
31

32
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under Saskatchewan’s legislation employees have an inherent right to allow access to trade
union representatives, while elsewhere the right to access arises only once it is granted by the
board.
But even with permission or authorization, organizing on the employer’s premises may be more
difficult than organizing in an environment in which meetings can take place away without the
knowledge of the employer.
To conclude, while we hypothesize that there are likely to be some additional difficulties
organizing workplaces with mobile workers, what is really required are case studies of
organizing in this context. We will come back to look at the studies of organizing where there
are temporary foreign workers, and this may shed some light on the situation of mobile workers
more generally, but the fact of their precarious immigration status leads us to be cautious about
generalizing from their experience.
B. Accretion of Mobile Workers into Existing Collective Agreements
When a new employee is hired by a unionized firm the question arises as to whether or not that
employee is in the bargaining unit and therefore covered by the collective agreement. This is the
issue of accretion. Usually, the issue is pretty straightforward. Bargaining unit descriptions are
usually in terms of “all employees” subject to exclusions. This contemplates that the bargaining
unit will grow or shrink as new employees are hired or existing employees leave. If issues arise,
typically they are resolved through grievance arbitration. 36 In the absence of a dispute over
whether mobile workers who transition in and out of a workplace are in the bargaining unit
(which as we have noted is unlikely) we do not foresee any particular problem for mobile
workers in this regard.
C. Carry Over of Seniority
When a unionized employee moves from one unionized job to another, sometimes even with the
same employer in the same province, a major issue is whether they carry their seniority with
them. This is an extremely important consideration because within the collective bargaining
regime seniority plans an important role in allocating job benefits and risks. As a result, the
issue has attracted a fair bit of attention, which is reflected in grievances and unfair labour
practice complaints. Because mobility is a structural feature of work in the construction
industry, special rules have often been developed to address this concern. For that reason, we

36

Adams, 7.800.
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first address issues of seniority carry over outside of construction and then turn examine its
operation in that industry.
1. . Carry Over of Seniority – Non-construction
Once it is established that a worker has become a member of a new bargaining unit, the question
may arise as to whether the new worker is entitled to carry over seniority from his or her
previous job. Of course, this issue can only arise when the worker was previously employed in a
unionized setting where he or she was accumulating seniority pursuant to a collective
agreement. The issue arises frequently in the construction industry, where movement from one
job site to another is the norm, and this context will be discussed in a separate section of the
report. Here we consider the issue in other contexts.
As a preliminary matter, it will be useful to say a few words about seniority in the collective
bargaining context. Seniority has been described as one of the most important features of
collective bargaining in that in constrains employer prerogative by requiring the employer to
take into account the length of time that the employee has been employed by that employer.
According to one commonly cited arbitration award:
Seniority is one of the most important and far-reaching benefits which the trade
union movement has been able to secure for its members by virtue of the
collective bargaining process. An employee's seniority under the terms of a
collective agreement gives rise to such important rights as relief from lay-off,
right to recall to employment, vacations and vacation pay, and pension rights to
name only a few. It follows, therefore, that an employee's seniority should only be
affected by very clear language in the collective agreement concerned and that
that arbitrators should construe the collective agreement with the utmost
strictness wherever it is contended that an employee's seniority has been
forfeited, truncated or abridged under the relevant sections of the collective
agreement. 37
The above quote cites a number of the uses of seniority, but it will be helpful to distinguish
between two types of uses. On the one hand, for some purposes the importance of seniority is
Re United Electrical Workers, Local 512 and Tung-Sol of Canada Ltd. (1964), 15 L.A.C. 161 [‘Re United
Electrical Workers’] at 162, which is not a case of plant closure but was relied upon in the case of British
Columbia Fruit Packers Co-Operative v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 247 [2003]
B.C.C.A.A.A. No. 149 [‘BC Fruit Packers’] at para 63.
37
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absolute, in the sense that its accumulation entitles the worker to an additional benefit
regardless of how much seniority other workers have accumulated. For example, additional
seniority may increase the number of weeks of vacation that a worker can take in a year or add
to the worker’s pension eligibility and entitlement regardless of other workers’ seniority. On the
other hand, sometime the importance of seniority is relative in that it establishes a pecking
order of entitlement. “Last hired, first fired” is just one example of this function of seniority. As
well, a more senior employee may be entitled to “bump” into a job held by a less senior
employee if the more senior employee’s job is terminated. These two different functions of
seniority are important because of their consequences and the impact on the bargaining unit.
With regard to issues where seniority is absolute, there is unlikely to be inter-worker conflict
since one worker has no stake in opposing recognition of another worker’s seniority. Indeed,
there is likely to be solidarity in supporting recognition of seniority rights. However, when
seniority rights are relative, then internecine conflict is much more likely recognition of as one
worker’s seniority potentially leaves another worker or group of workers worse off. It also puts
unions in a difficult position, trying to balance the interests of different groups of members.
Indeed, as we shall see, sometimes disputes over seniority erupt in the form of complaints
against unions for failing to represent the interests of members.
A further complication of seniority is that it can be accumulated for different purposes and in
different ways. For example, seniority for the purpose of calculating vacation entitlement may
be determined on the basis of the length of time a worker has been in the bargaining unit, while
seniority for promotion may depend on the amount of time that a person has been employment
in a particular job classification. This necessarily complicates any discussion of the carry-over of
seniority for mobile workers.
There are basically three different scenarios in which the carry-over of seniority arises: 1) multilocation agreements where a worker moves from one location to another; 2) intra-union
transfers where an employee moves from one bargaining unit to another bargaining unit
represented by the same union; and 3) inter-union transfers where an employee moves from one
bargaining unit to another but each bargaining unit is represented by a different union.

a. A worker who is part of a multi-location bargaining unit moves from one
location to another within the same bargaining unit
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Figure 3

As we discussed earlier, the geographic scope of bargaining units can vary significantly from
province to province and industry to industry. The broader the scope of the unit, the more likely
it will cover multiple locations. What happens to seniority when an employee moves from one
location to another within the same bargaining unit? This will depend on the basis on which
seniority is calculated and that depends on the terms of the collective agreement. If there is a
single seniority list then issues concerning transfer of seniority rarely arise. For instance while
bumping between seniority lists has generally been viewed as problematic, bumping within the
same seniority list, even between separate workplaces, has not raised much litigation. But it is
not uncommon to find agreements that provide for separate seniority lists for different
workplace locations.
Where a single individual moves from one location to another, then it is pretty clear that they do
not carry seniority to the new location, at least in regard to their seniority relative to other
workers at that location. More complicated scenarios may arise where one location closes and
the employees at the closed location relocate to a remaining one. Collective bargaining
agreements may provide that in the case of plant closures, the union and the employer will meet
to discuss the result for employees. This may result in an arrangement to allow the transferred
employees to retain their seniority at the new location, a practice called dovetailing, whereby
seniority lists are merged based on the start date in either plant. However, employees in the
receiving plant may oppose such an arrangement because it may detrimentally affect their
relative seniority. This sometimes leads to allegations that the union breached its duty of fair
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representation or grievances. Labour relations boards and arbitrators are generally
unsympathetic to such claims, as the following passage illustrates:
Dovetailing then is ordinarily viewed as the preferred method for achieving an
optimal resolution. Dovetailing accords with the principle against truncating
seniority….. Its adoption by arbitrators and labour relations boards is based on a
sense of fairness and a reluctance to diminish seniority rights. It appears to be a
reaction to endtailing, which would place one group behind another where the
most senior employee of the lesser group would be lower than the most junior
employee of the other group. Endtailing would often be responsive to selfinterested majority rule, as opposed to being responsive to reason. Also, it would
tend to favour the receiving location which would have been selected by
management for corporate and commercial reasons. 38
Hence in the case of BC Fruit Packers, when employees were transferred to a plant following a
plant closure and a dovetailing arrangement was agreed upon by the union and the employer,
the employees in the receiving plant were unsuccessful in their challenge.” 39
Of course, it is to be emphasized that just as seniority is a right that arises under the collective
agreement, so too is its carry over. If a collective bargaining agreement does not permit carry
over between separate locations within the same bargaining unit, then it will not be permitted.
On the other hand, as we have seen, where collective agreements do not preclude dovetailing,
then there is a presumption that it should be favoured in the absence of some extraordinary
circumstance which would justify a departure. 40

b. Intra-Union Transfer: A worker moves from one workplace to another, into a
different bargaining unit represented by the same union
Figure 4

38 British Columbia Fruit Packers Co-Operative v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local
247 [2003] B.C.C.A.A.A. No. 149, para. 72.
39 BC Fruit Packers, ibid.
40 Ibid., para. 71.
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Generally speaking, an employee who moves from one bargaining unit to another, even if those
bargaining units are represented by the same union, will not be able to carry over seniority. This
is because seniority rights flow from the collective agreement, not from union membership
itself. This was explained in the case of Milk and Bread Drivers:
Employees in a particular bargaining unit do not necessarily have the same terms and
conditions of employment as those in another bargaining unit - even if the other unit is
represented by the same trade union - nor do employees in a particular bargaining unit
necessarily have ANY RIGHTS AT ALL IN RESPECT OF JOBS IN ANOTHER
BARGAINING UNIT, unless the relevant collective agreements so provide. 41 (emphasis
in original)
This approach also holds true in the case of plant shutdowns where workers are transferred to
another location represented by the same union but where that location is in a different
bargaining unit. Importantly, transfer and integration of seniority into a new CBU is governed
by the collective agreement of the receiving workplace unless otherwise altered by an additional
agreement. 42 Here there will be a presumption that if the receiving bargaining unit opts to endtail the incoming employees, it will not have abrogated its duty of fair representation, unless
there are exceptional circumstances. In the Beachville Lime case, the board held:

Milk and Bread Drivers, Dairy Employees, Caterers and Allied Employees Local Union 647, [1995]
O.L.R.D. No. 4015 [‘Milk and Bread Drivers’] at para 14. See also Woodbridge Foam Corp, [2000]
O.L.R.D. No. 5477 [‘Woodbridge Foam’] “[s]eniority rights are acquired by membership within a
bargaining unit, they are not acquired by employment with a particular employer”: Woodbridge Foam at
para 26. Woodbridge Foam provides an extreme example where any transfer of seniority rights from one
CBU to another was flatly rejected by the receiving CBU. Despite the leadership of the receiving CBU
acting “unsympathetically,” it was found to be within their right based on the collective agreement, which
had substantively similar plant closure provisions to the collective agreement of the closing plant.
42 Ibid at para 20.
41
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As noted … the Board must take great care in assessing Local 3264’s rationale for
end-tailing the former Local 774 members, and leaving them vulnerable to the
inevitable layoffs initiated by Beachville Lime Limited. Seniority rights are
fundamental to the collective bargaining system, and their abrogation must be
justified. On the other hand, … it is not the Board’s role to second guess, or
substitute its hindsight for, the decision of a trade union faced with the problem
of competing seniority interests. Often, in such cases, there is no right or wrong
answer. As the Board noted, in assessing the relative merits of end-tailing and
dove-tailing, “some inequities or unfairness may attach to either method of
integrating seniority lists…and it is inevitably a situation where some employees
will always be disadvantaged by and dissatisfied with whichever approach is
taken. 43
Of course, this is a scenario in which the consequences of Canada’s highly fragmented model of
representational unionism have particularly acute consequences for mobile workers.

c. Inter-Union Transfer: A worker moves from a workplace represented by one
union to a workplace represented by another
Figure 5

43

Beachville Lime Ltd., [2003] O.L.R.D. No. 3610 at para 127.
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As with intra-union transfers between bargaining units, there is no presumed transfer of rights
based on seniority in the case of inter-union transfer, whether we are dealing with a single
individual or a group in the context of a plant shutdown. This general rule is articulated
straightforwardly in the case of Michael Burkett, although this was not a case of geographic
mobility but of labour-market mobility. The employer operated two facilities, one on Walmer
Road in Toronto, the other at Don Mills, each of which was organized by a different union.
When the employer closed its Walmer Road facility, employees were offered (and some
accepted) an opportunity to work at the Don Mills facility; the union at the Don Mills facility
took the position that the incoming employees should be end-tailed on the seniority list,
prompting the incoming employees to complain that the receiving union breached it duty of fair
representation. The Board found no breach: the Walmer Road employees were from a different
bargaining unit; had separate legal rights; and had no legal right under any collective agreement
to transfer or bump into the Don Mills facility, let alone to have their seniority at the Walmer
Road plant recognized at the Don Mills plant. Although this is not a case of geographic mobility,
it i 44
There are of course exceptions. While neither employers nor unions can unilaterally confer
seniority, they can agree to do so. Of course, where the seniority is exercised against the
employer in terms of vacation or other entitlements, the union may not object but the employer
is unlikely to be amenable to such an arrangement. Where the seniority affects rights as
between bargaining unit members, the employer may not object, but the trade union
representing the incoming workers may be more reluctant. However, in some cases there may
be agreements between trade unions to recognize the seniority rights of each other’s members if
44

[1988] OLRB Rep March 274.
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they move between the unions’ bargaining units. In one case, involving OPSEU and CUPE,
which did not have such an agreement, the labour board commented on the logic of such a
policy.
Presumably this policy is intended to protect OPSEU members who could potentially be
displaced by members of other unions or who might be laid off in advance of members
who had acquired seniority in another bargaining unit. From the union's point of view,
that result would only be fair if the OPSEU members would have the same right vis a vis
the members of the other union. 45
Absent terms in the collective agreement, an additional agreement, or a bilateral agreement
between unions, seniority calculation will generally begin from the date of hire into the new
bargaining unit.

d. Conclusion
Carryover of seniority is an issue that will affect a limited number of mobile workers who move
from one unionized job to another. The question of whether such an entitlement exists is not
directly governed by provincial labour relations statutes, but rather through collective
agreements, additional agreements (particularly those surrounding workplace closures),
internal union policies and bilateral agreements between unions. Absent clear and specific
provisions to the contrary, labour relations boards have generally interpreted these agreements
to preserve the seniority of workers moving between workplaces but remaining in the same
bargaining units by favouring a dove-tailing of seniority lists. In the context of intra-union or
inter-union transfer of employees between bargaining units, the presumption is that seniority is
not carried over unless a relevant agreement contains specific language to the contrary. This
will generally result in an end-tailing approach. Unions could better accommodate mobile
workers by adopting a more universal approach to recognizing seniority acquired in other
bargaining units, but in general they have not chosen to do so.
The construction industry and some trades, however, have addressed the issue differently
because historically their members moved from job site to job site on a regular basis. Mobility
was the norm, not the exception, and so different policies developed, which are considered next.

45

Ontario Public Service Employees Union [1996] O.L.R.D. No. 3065 at para 33.
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2. Carryover of Seniority in the Construction Context (Outside Quebec) 46
In the construction industry, work locations are inherently transitory, being generally projectbased and the work product being non-transportable. 47 Workers are frequently hired for a
specific project, working in different crews in different locations, and subsequently laid off;
seniority may be highly determinative of the order of hire and layoff, and is therefore of major
consequence in this industry. As discussed above, the construction industry in Canada provides
Canada’s strongest example of broader-based regulatory bargaining, with collective agreements
that often apply to all employees of an employer, or all employers within a particular industry,
within a specified geographical area. 48 These territories range in size, and may include a single
municipality, a considerable geographical area, or even an entire province (ie. to the furthest
extent of a board’s jurisdiction). 49 It may therefore be possible for craft workers in the
construction industry to move within vast geographical territories without ever leaving their
initial bargaining unit.
Despite the promise of continuity of seniority that such a bargaining structure appears to offer
for mobile workers, we have observed that in the construction context, the terms of collective
agreements often complicate the carryover of seniority, even for E-RGM within the geographical
46 This section of the report does not apply to the construction industry in Quebec which has a unique
regime in that union membership is compulsory in order to work in the industry. It is beyond the scope of
this report to discuss the implications of that regime for E-RGM within for Quebec construction workers
moving within the province.
This report also does not address the operation of the “Ontario-Quebec Agreement on Labour Mobility
and Recognition of Qualifications, Skills and Work Experience in the Construction Industry” (2006),
except to note that with regard to unionization, the agreement provides:
“Ontario and Quebec agree that membership in a trade union will not inhibit labour mobility. At
the same time, both provinces acknowledge that union membership may be required by
provincial law or by convention within the construction industry.”
The effect is that Ontario workers must prove union membership to work in the Quebec construction
industry. A more detailed study of this regime would be required to fully understand how collective
bargaining works in the context of Ontario-Quebec interprovincial mobility.

Adams, supra note ??? at 15.10.
See for example Ontario’s Labour Relations Act, 1995, SO 1995, c 1, Sch A at s 128(1), which reads that
“Where a trade union applies for certification as bargaining agent of the employees of an employer, the
Board shall determine the unit of employees that is appropriate for collective bargaining by reference to a
geographic area and it shall not confine the unit to a particular project.” (emphasis added)
Newfoundland’s Labour Relations Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. L-1, contains a similar provision at s. 43(1).
49 For example, Alberta’s Labour Relations Code, R.S.A. 2000, c. L-1, s. 171(2) provides for province-wide
collective bargaining units in any industry sub-sector which the Board finds to be appropriate for
collective bargaining. In the industrial, commercial and institutional sector [‘ICI sector’] in Ontario, all
collective bargaining units are certified on a province-wide basis. Bargaining units are thus represented by
either a province-wide bargaining agency or by a group of trade unions, while employers may form
employer associations for the purposes of collective bargaining. Saskatchewan’s construction-specific
labour relations regime provides for province-wide collective bargaining without being restricted to the
ICI sector: see Adams, supra note ??? at 15.370.
47
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area covered by the collective agreement. While a collective bargaining region in the
construction industry will always include multiple worksites, seniority will not necessarily be
carried over with all movements within that region. Unlike in the industrial union context,
where an analysis of carryover seniority logically begins with the question of whether the mobile
worker has remained in his or her initial bargaining unit, in the construction industry a broader
initial investigation is required with an eye towards the collective agreement.
We suggest that such an investigation proceed in three steps. The first step is to determine the
type of seniority rights under examination. Determining carryover of seniority in the
construction context is something of a moving target, as the purpose for which seniority is
relevant may change the nature of the inquiry. As we noted in the previous section, seniority
may be absolute, as in the accumulation of entitlements to pension benefits, or it may be relative
in the sense that what matters is one’s seniority relative to that of other workers, as is the case in
determining who has priority in hiring and layoffs, bumping and transfers. A collective
agreement may speak differentially to the various types of seniority-based rights that may
accrue, thus for the sake of analytical precision it is necessary to disentangle those rights and
focus the inquiry on the specific right in issue.
The second step is to determine whether the worker’s mobility has led them into the employ of a
new employer and, if so, whether the particular seniority-based right at issue is intended to
survive the worker’s movement between employers. 50 If the worker has remained with the same
employer, then this will not present a barrier to continuity of seniority (although it is not
determinative of continuity of seniority either). In the construction context, where collective
agreements frequently apply to more than one employer (often represented by an employers’
association), seemingly-broad seniority provisions such as province-wide, industry-wide
seniority may be seriously curtailed when an employee changes employers. Labour boards look
to the language of the collective agreement in order to determine whether the various employer
and employee associations involved in reaching a collective agreement demonstrate an intention
to honour seniority accrued with other employers. By way of example, a province and industrywide collective agreement signed by multiple employers in Ontario’s elevator industry provided
both that “[s]eniority of an Employee is his total length of service in the industry in Ontario” and
50 This inquiry must be distinguished from the question of “who is the employer” for the purposes of
collective bargaining. In the situation considered here, the employer is known and is a signatory to the
collective agreement; the issue is whether seniority rights are to be honoured when a worker moves
between employers.
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that “...an employee has no seniority rights with an employer for a period of six (6) months after
commencing work with that employer.” 51 In one case concerning that collective agreement, it
was found that the six-month qualifying period had to be served with the same employer for a
consecutive period of six months; clearly the intention was that seniority would not remain
intact with mobility between employers. 52 In another case concerning the same collective
agreement, however, the Board wrote that “[t]he purpose of seniority on a province-wide basis...
is to ensure seniority rights are not lost through mobility either between employers or between
each Local’s hiring hall.” 53 It is open to parties negotiating collective agreements (particularly
where multiple employers are involved) to provide for or disallow carryover of seniority for
workers moving between employers. If the construction industry worker has changed employers
but the parties did not intend for carryover of seniority between employers, then the inquiry will
end here and seniority will not be maintained.
The third step is to determine what we have called the “nexus of seniority,” that is, the
geographical formation to which seniority attaches and from which seniority rights are derived.
In order to determine the nexus of seniority in any given case, one must look to the operative
collective agreement, although the conduct of the parties may also serve to supplement or aid in
the interpretation of the terms of the collective agreement, as well as to establish general
practices around carryover of seniority. 54 Based on an investigation of labour case law, the
following sections illustrate how different formations may serve as the nexus of seniority for the
purpose of determining whether seniority rights may be carried over as a worker moves between
workplaces. It should be noted that conflicts concerning carryover of seniority can be avoided
where parties clearly state their intentions as to what seniority rights derive from these various
formations.

a. Yards or Dispatch Sites
In the construction industry, workers will often perform work out of a particular yard or
dispatch site. While actual worksites will frequently change, collective agreements may provide
for continued seniority so long as the worker is dispatched from their particular yard or “home
Otis Elevator Company Ltd. [1992] OLRD no 3542 [‘Otis Elevator’] at para 4.
[1994] OLRD No 3547 [‘Dover Elevator 1994’]. The facts of this case feature an employee seeking to
count two separate periods of employment with the same employer cumulatively (which the Board did not
allow), although the principle stands that seniority would certainly not carry over between employers.
53 ThyssenKrupp Elevators (Canada) Ltd. [2006] OLRD No. 2277 [‘ThyssenKrupp Elevators 2006’] at
para 13.
54 See for example 1130887 Ontario Inc. (c.o.b. Latta Crane Services), [2011] OLRD No 1324 [‘Latta
Crane Services’].
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base.” In the case of Latta Crane Services, a province-wide, non-ICI sector collective agreement
provided for seniority on a yard-by-yard basis; seniority would accrue with work dispatched out
of the particular yard which served as the employee’s home base. 55 Through conduct, the parties
established that workers who transferred home bases could retain seniority only with the
consent of the union. The live issue in the case is largely irrelevant here; the Board was faced
with the question of whether a new yard opened by the employer (and staffed by workers from
the union hiring hall) could serve as a home base for the purpose of accrual of seniority; the
Board found it could. What is of interest here is that, despite continued work for the same
employer and a province-wide bargaining unit, the arrangement in Latta Crane Services
maintained a nexus between seniority and work out of a particular home base.

b. Projects
In the case of Hydro One Inc., 56 the Labourers’ International Union of North America [‘LIUNA’]
grieved the order in which workers were laid off from a particular project. The Ontario Labour
Relations Board was faced with the question of whether a collective agreement provided for
seniority (for the purpose of layoffs) across the union’s geographic jurisdiction, or whether
seniority was to be applied on a project-by-project basis. The relevant language of the collective
agreement was to be found in the heading of the section governing order of layoffs; a previous
agreement had read “Project Layoff Procedure,” while the new agreement read simply “Layoff
Procedure.” 57 The Board paid little attention to this alteration, which was never the subject of
negotiation between parties; it was much more concerned with the logical interpretation of the
agreement based on the intentions of the parties. The Board found that the nexus of seniority in
this case was indeed a “project,” defined as “a distinct package of construction work at a
particular place and time... It does not make practical or labour relations sense to deem all the
work within a construction trade union’s jurisdiction to constitute one project.” The effect of
finding a nexus between seniority and geographical zone for the purpose of layoff would be that,
as work slowed down on a particular project, workers on other unrelated projects would have to
be laid off, causing disruption to the operations of the employer. For mobile workers, the
implications of project-wide seniority versus geographic region seniority may depend on their
particular situation. A worker who workers moves within the geographic jurisdiction
presumably would benefit from seniority based on the jurisdiction since they would be better

Ibid at para 24.
[2012] OLRD no 2626 [‘Hydro One 2012’].
57 Ibid at para 15.
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protected from lay-offs in a context in which some workers on the project came from outside the
geographic region, even those ‘outside’ workers had been on the project longer.

c. Regions within the Collective Bargaining Region
A different collective agreement between Hydro One Inc. and the Canadian Union of Skilled
Workers [‘CUSW’] featured an expanding nexus of seniority as seniority accrued from the
employee’s “established commencement date,” particularly as it applied to layoff and bumping
between geographical regions. Employees with less than two years’ seniority had no seniority
rights. After two years, employees enjoyed seniority within their home geographical region,
which allowed for the exercise of seniority rights within that geographical region. After five
years, employees gained province-wide seniority, which allowed them to bump between
geographical regions. 58 Since the intentions of the parties are crucial to the interpretation of
collective agreements (as we have seen in Hydro One 2012), it is incumbent on negotiating
parties to consider whether worker mobility is a foreseeable issue, and to clarify how movement
within and among geographical zones will impact seniority. In this case, it is clear that seniority
rights were attached to a particular geographical region, but were not industry-wide as they
concerned one particular employer.

d. Local Union Jurisdiction
Even in cases where a collective agreement appears to create a province-wide, industry-wide
seniority regime, the division of a territory into various union jurisdictions may render the
exercise of industry-wide seniority rights elusive. Particularly where the multiple union locals
who are parties to an industry-wide collective agreement keep separate seniority lists for their
separate territorial jurisdictions, an analysis of carryover of seniority must consider whether this
has the effect (on paper or in practice) of establishing local union jurisdiction as the operative
nexus of seniority. Another case arising out of the collective agreement established in Ontario’s
elevator industry centred on a dispute over order of layoffs. In addition to seniority being
determined based on length of time in the industry in Ontario, a provision within that collective
agreement limited the rights of industry-wide bumping to specific categories of employees. The
grievors were members of those categories and believed they should have a right to bump lesssenior employees in “international jurisdiction” (that is, residual territory not covered by the
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Hydro One Inc., [2009] OLRD no 2516.
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jurisdiction of any local union). 59 The local union bringing the grievance held that there is a
single, province-wide seniority list which set out bumping rights; the employer held that there
are separate lists for each local union and, within each local union, for each employer. 60 The
board sided with the latter interpretation, writing that
[a]lthough the collective agreement states in Article 10.14.01 that seniority is comprised
of an employee's total length of service in the industry in Ontario, it is clear from the
evidence that the accepted practice is somewhat more refined.
The Board found that the provisions for industry-wide bumping had to be read alongside the
jurisdictional provisions, which restricted the jurisdiction of the local unions to the people
working within that jurisdiction. 61 Where an otherwise province-wide, industry-wide collective
agreement sets out specific jurisdictions for local unions, those territorial jurisdictions may
serve as the nexus of seniority for certain seniority rights. 62

e. Industry-Wide Seniority
Again, provisions within collective agreements which allow for industry-wide seniority must be
drafted and read with caution. For certain purposes, such as wage calculation and vacation
entitlement, industry-wide seniority has been recognized with relatively little opposition. Other
exercises of seniority-based rights have been heavily contested and significantly limited. One
must consider whether other clauses in the collective agreement may conflict with such broad
provisions for certain purposes, and whether the conduct of the parties indicates that seniority
rights have been treated on a more limited basis, or that seniority may not be carried over with
E-RGM. As seen in Hydro One 2012, where an interpretation of the collective agreement would
result in an outcome that defies labour relations sense, parties may have difficulty establishing
that this was the intended effect.

f. National (Mobility Between Provinces)
As we have discussed, Canada’s federalism structure makes the prospect of nation-wide
seniority impracticable, except in a limited number of federally-governed industries. Generally,
collective agreements which allow for the incorporation of workers from other provinces into

59 Dover Corp. (Canada) Ltd. [2000] OLRD No. 2746 [‘Dover Corp. 2000’] at para 55. For a better
overview of that collective agreement, see Otis Elevator, supra note ??? at para 4.
60 Ibid at para 8.
61 Ibid at para 53.
62 See also ThyssenKrupp Elevators 2006, supra note ???.
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collective bargaining regimes provide for preferential treatment of local union members and
members within the province. 63 While it is conceivable that inter-provincial agreements could
be developed allowing for continuity of seniority (for certain purposes) with out-of-province
work, priority for local and provincial members is generally fiercely guarded. We are unaware of
any such cases where seniority-based bumping or layoff rights have been successfully asserted
by out-of-province workers. In one case, a local union member was laid off while there were still
out-of-province workers on travel cards. The collective agreement provided preference in layoffs
to local union members; the Board found that so long as there were workers employed on travel
cards (ie. mobile workers) the local member could not be laid off. 64

Collective Bargaining for Geographically Mobile Workers Who Do Not

IV.

Change Jobs
As we noted, most of our analysis has focused on the situation of geographically mobile workers
who change jobs and as a result need to be (re)incorporated into the collective bargaining
regime. However, as we have also noted, that situation does not encompass the full spectrum of
E-RGM and in particular does not speak to the situation of workers who are geographically
mobile but remain covered by the same collective agreement. Commuters, for example, would
fall into this category. For them, the principle issue is whether their needs as geographically
mobile workers are adequately addressed by the collective agreement. What these needs are is
an empirical question for which field work is required, but one might hypothesize that they
would be concerned about such matters as the cost of transportation and accommodation and
work scheduling. The extent to which collective bargaining agreements meet the needs of
geographically mobile workers is also an empirical, not a legal question, and requires research
into the contents of collective agreements and case studies of particular groups of mobile
workers covered by collective agreements. To our knowledge, no such studies have been
undertaken and such a study is beyond the scope of this report.
We have, however, examined a Canadian publication, Contract Clauses, 65 that samples existing
collective agreements to provide model contract language to identify contract clauses applicable
to the specific needs of geographically mobile workers. Apart from seniority and transfer rights
issues, which we already considered in the previous section, we found relatively few contract
63 See for example Campbell Construction Ltd. and CJA, Local 1598 (Re) (2004), 117 CLRBR (2d) 212 at
para 9.
64 Sutherland and Schultz, a Vollmer Company [2010] OLRD no 1894.
65 Jeffrey Sack and Ethan Poskanzer, Contract Clauses: Collective Agreement Language in Canada, 3rd
ed., (Toronto: Lancaster Books, 1996, looseleaf).
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clauses attentive to the specific needs of geographically mobile workers. The most obvious ones
were in relation to travel allowances and expenses. It may be self-evident, but it is conceptually
useful to point out that collective agreements start from the presumption that employees will be
responsible for their own travel costs and arrangements to and from the worksite. As a result,
terms specific to the situation of workers who commute, work in remote locations, relocate or
work at various job sites must be bargained for through the collective bargaining process.
Some collective agreements provide workers who travel out of town on their employer’s business
with reimbursement for food and lodging. The basis for reimbursement is explained in one
collective agreement:
The purpose of the travelling provisions of the Article is to provide employees with
reimbursement for reasonable out of pocket expenses incurred while engaged in work
away from their normal place of work or headquarters zone. The rates paid are not
intended to supplement an employee’s income. 66
Other agreements provide detailed schedules regarding meal and accommodation allowances,
including provisions that increase allowances when employees travel to more remote locations.
Another type of collective agreement provision that specifically addresses E-RGM is a Northern
Allowance, which is paid to non-local employees. One provision defines “Northern Allowance”
as a flat weekly rate to be paid to “non-local” employees (hired in a location other than the
Northern locality where they are headquartered) working in a Northern Locality (as designated
by the employer) in addition to their basic salary. Northern localities are categorized as either
north or south of the 55th parallel, with a higher allowance paid to workers in communities
further north; allowances increase after one year of service. 67 A simpler Northern Allowance
clause reads:
An employee who is employed at a location north of the 57th parallel of north latitude in
the Province of Alberta shall be paid in addition to his basic salary, a Northern Allowance
of one hundred and sixty dollars ($160.00) for each month served. 68

IBEW, Local 2034 and Manitoba Hydro-Electric Board, ibid at 16-22.
CTEA and Bell Canada, ibid at 16-23.
68 AUPE and Government of Alberta, ibid.
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Relocation expenses are another consideration that has been factored into collective agreements
to provide for the needs of geographically mobile workers. A basic relocation expenses clause
reads as follows:
When an employee is permanently transferred, at the Company’s request, from one
headquarters area to another, the cost of moving his household effects and the cost of
personal transportation for the employee and his family shall be paid by the Company. 69
A more complex clause provides for lodging and food for the employee and his family while in
transit, an allowance for miscellaneous out of pocket expenses, costs for terminating a lease,
time off with pay during relocation, vehicle mileage, and legal and real estate brokerage fees. 70
Transportation allowances may also be negotiated into the collective agreement, particularly
when they cover costs incurred in the course of an employee’s duties. This may include a set
mileage rate and may also include the cost of insurance deductibles for accidents occurring in
the performance of an employee’s duties. 71 Generally, transportation allowances address
mobility during work hours, within the course of employment, rather than travel from one’s
residence to a worksite or extended periods away from the place where a person regularly
resides.
Of greater significance to these mobile workers are travel allowances, which address not only
expenses incurred during transit but also compensation for time spent in transit (in this sense
the travel allowance more closely resembles a wage than an allowance). One provision sets out
the circumstances in which an employee must be reimbursed for time spent travelling:
Travel to and from a relief or special assignment will be in accordance with the following:
Travel time, including reasonable pre-flight and post-flight ground time if an
employee is travelling by air, will be considered time worked. …
An employee who travels on a scheduled day [off] will not be debited if travel
time is less than their scheduled shifts.
All travel not requested by the Company will be done on the employee’s own
time. 72
TWU and B.C. Telephone, ibid at 16-24.
Ibid.
71 BCGEU and Legal Services Society, ibid at 16-30.
72 CAW and Air Ontario, ibid at 16-32.
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Another basic travel allowance provision distinguishes between the time required to get from
the employee’s home to their ordinary worksite (which is the responsibility of the employee) and
additional travel time required within the course of employment (which is the responsibility of
the company). The provision reads that:
Employees shall be compensated for travel time in excess of the time required to travel
between their residence and their regular point of assembly. Accommodation, board,
lodging and transfer expenses for employees required to work away from their point of
assembly shall be paid in accordance with Appendix “B”. 73
Other provisions provide a formula for the calculation of travel time:
It is agreed that when employees are sent outside of the jurisdiction radius covered in
this Agreement, travelling time will be paid at single time rate for the actual hours
travelled during regular working hours. Additional travelling time up to five (5) hours
will be paid at single time rates, for the actual hours travelled beyond regular working
hours the first day only. If the trip requires more than one day, travelling time will be
paid at single time rates for the actual hours travelled during regular working hours the
second, third, or fourth day and any additional days necessary to complete a trip.
Expenses incurred during trip to be paid for by the Employer. 74
Finally, collective agreements may include provisions which allow employees working in remote
locations to receive travel leave with pay when proceeding on vacation or sick leave. Presumably
such a provision would be in place to ensure that vacation time is not wasted in transit to and
from a remote location. One such clause reads that:
An employee at an isolated post who is proceeding on vacation or sick leave shall be entitled
to travel leave (leave of absence with pay) of three (3) working days or actual travel time,
whichever is the lesser, for purposes of travel from his/her post to a point of departure and
to return from a point of departure to his/her post. 75

BCFMWU and B.C. Ferry Corporation, ibid.
NEWA and National Elevator and Escalator Association, ibid at 16-32.1.
75 CUPW and Canada Post, ibid at 18-57.
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Temporary Foreign Workers (TFW)

V.

As we noted earlier, the issue of collective bargaining for temporary foreign workers requires
separate treatment, not because they do not have the same rights and freedoms as other
Canadian workers to participate in collective bargaining, but rather because they have a much
more precarious status in Canada, which creates special problems for their ability to actually
exercise their rights and freedoms. It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide an in-depth
discussion of the growth and status of TFWs. However, by way of introduction we do want to say
a few words about the growth and characteristics of the temporary foreign worker programs in
Canada.
There has been an enormous growth in the use of temporary foreign workers in Canada. In
2000, 116,540 TFWs arrived in Canada, but most left after a very short stay because they had
been recruited under the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program. As a result, on December 1,
2000, the day used to count the total number of TFWs present in Canada for the year, there
were only 89,746. In 2011, 190,769 entered and there were 300,111 present, reflecting the
growth of other programs, particularly the low-skill program that entitles workers to stay for a
longer continuous period. Not surprisingly the growth in both the number of TFWs arriving in
Canada each year and the total number present at any one time has attracted much attention
and there is now a large literature looking at TFWs. 76 Our purpose here is just to briefly
highlight a few salient features relevant to understanding the difficulty of incorporating them
into collective bargaining.
It is important to begin by recognizing that the TFW category actually consists of several
different programs each of which has its own particular characteristics. However, there are two
features that are common to all TFW programs. First, TFWs do not have the same right to
circulate freely in the Canadian labour market as persons with permanent status. In some cases,
TFWs are tied to their contract of employment and can only change employers in limited
circumstances, while in others they have open work permits but can only be hired by employers
who have obtained permission to hire TFWs. Because of these limitations, the loss of one’s
current job can result in deportation or in having to leave Canada in the absence of a means of
support. Second, subject to some exceptions, the right of TFWs to remain in Canada is time76 For a small sample, see Judy Fudge and Fiona MacPhail, “The Temporary Foreign Worker Program in
Canada: Low Skilled Worker as an Extreme form of Flexible Labour” (2009) 31(5) Comparative Labour
Law and Policy Journal 843; Sarah Marsden, “The New Precariousness: Temporary Migrants and the
Law in Canada” (2012) 27 Canadian Journal of Law and Society 209; Fay Faraday, Made in Canada:
How the Law Constructs Migrant Workers’ Insecurity (Report, Metcalf Foundation, September 2012).
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limited. 77 They are required to leave Canada when the term of their work permit expires. These
characteristics, among others, 78 produce high levels of immigration status insecurity that
adversely affect the willingness of workers to exercise the rights they do enjoy under Canadian
labour and employment law.
A. Unionizing Temporary Foreign Workers
Although we are not aware of data on the question, we are confident that most TFWs are hired
into workplaces that are non-unionized. In some cases, the workforce may be comprised of all
or mostly TFWs, while in others it will be a mixed workforce. In either situation, the presence of
a significant number of TFWs changes the organizing environment. As well, union attitudes to
TFWs has evolved over time, beginning with a view that their entry should be restricted to
protect jobs for Canadians and then moving toward an understanding of TFWs as vulnerable
and in need of union advocacy to protect their rights. 79 These changing attitudes presumably
influence union strategy around organizing. Because TFWs enter through a number of different
programs, it is difficult to generalize. In this report we will discuss three: the Live-In Caregiver
Program (LICP), the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program (SAWP) and the Low-Skill
Program.

1. LICP
The LICP, as its name suggests, allows families to hire a caregiver who will live in the family
home. The fact that these workers live in their employers’ premises excludes them from
statutory collective bargaining regimes in most jurisdictions. For example, the Ontario Labour
Relations Act specifically excludes domestic workers employed in a home. 80 However, even if
the exclusion is not present, most domestic workers still will not qualify to participate in
collective bargaining. This is because most statutes require that a bargaining unit must consist
of more than one employee and since most live-in care givers are the only employee in the
77 For example, the Live-In Caregiver Program allows workers to apply for permanent status after
completing 24 months of authorized full-time employment. Provincial Nominee Programs also provide a
way for qualified TFWs to transition to permanent status.
78 Temporary foreign workers suffer from several layers of vulnerability, in addition to their precarious
migration status. For a discussion, see Malcolm Sargeant and Eric Tucker, “Layers of Vulnerability in
Occupational Health and Safety for Migrant Workers: Case Studies from Canada and the UK,” (2010) 7:2
Policy and Practice in Occupational Health and Safety 51; Michael Quinlan. Also, see Deepa Rajkumar et
al., “At the Temporary-Permanent Divide: How Canada Produces Temporariness and Makes Citizens
Through its Security, Work, and Settlement Policies” (2012) 16 Citizenship Studies 483.
79 Jason Foster, “From ‘Canadians First’ to ‘Workers Unite’: Evolving Union Narratives of Migrant
Workers” (2014) 69 Relations Industrielles 241.
80 S.O. c. 1995, Chapter 1, Schedule A, s. 3(a).
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household, they cannot be part of a bargaining unit. 81 The absence of regulatory unionism or
even a broader-based bargaining structure that would allow an association of live-in caregivers
to negotiate an agreement on behalf of their members with their employers is fatal for this group
of TFWs, at least in respect of participating in a statutory scheme of bargaining. In its absence,
efforts have turned toward political action to protect live-in caregivers from exploitative
conditions. 82

2. Seasonal Agricultural Workers (SAWs)
The SAWP is the oldest of Canada’s temporary foreign worker programs and has not only
attracted the most attention from researchers but also from activists seeking to provide
assistance and advocacy. As well, there has probably been more effort to incorporate SAWs into
the collective bargaining regime than any other group of TFWs and some progress has been
made in recent years. Because provincial labour relations regimes vary from province to
province as does the experience organizing SAWs our discussion is organized by province,
focusing on Ontario, Manitoba, British Columbia and Quebec. However, before moving to a
jurisdiction by jurisdiction review, it will be helpful to say a few words about some common
issues.
Incorporating SAWs into collective bargaining is especially challenging because this group of
workers lies at the intersection of two sets of disadvantage, those of TFWs and those of
agricultural workers. Agricultural workers are sometimes disadvantaged because they are
adversely treated by labour and employment law. In particular, some provinces, notably
Ontario and Alberta, still exclude farm workers from their basic statutory collective bargaining
schemes, while others impose special conditions. We will discuss these in more detail as they
arise in our jurisdictional analysis. But even in the absence of legal disabilities, agricultural
workers are difficult to organize for other reasons. They tend to work in rural settings,
sometimes living on their employers’ premises, making it difficult to reach them. As well, their
work is often seasonal, which in some cases results in them moving periodically to a different
employer, sometimes in a different province. The representational character and fragmented
structure of Canadian labour law makes it a poor fit for agricultural workers generally.
Ibid., s. 9(1).
See Judy Fudge, “Little Victories and Big Defeats: The Rise and Fall of Collective Bargaining Rights for
Domestic Workers in Ontario” in Abigail B. Bakan and Daiva Stasiulis, eds., Not One of the Family:
Foreign Domestic Workers in Canada (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1997), 119. For a recent
example of legislation that aims to protect foreign live-in caregivers, see Employment Protection for
Foreign Nationals Act (Live-in Caregivers and Others), 2009, S.O. 2009, c. 32.
81
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TFWs in agriculture also suffer from additional disadvantages, in addition to their precarious
immigration status. They are likely to lack proficiency in English and French and be unfamiliar
with Canadian laws – this poses an impediment to both knowing and enforcing legal rights. Not
only are they in rural communities, but they may be isolated from the local population and lack
sources of support that Canadian workers may be able to draw on. The fact that they are only in
Canada temporarily and that the opportunity to earn money while they are here is so valuable
that they may be reluctant to engage in activities that could lead to the termination of their
employment, even though the termination may be unlawful. Additionally, in the SAWP farmers
are able to name workers who they want to return the following season. While this arrangement
allows some workers to return on a regular basis, it also makes workers vulnerable due to their
desire to be invited back. Finally, while SAWs are entitled to consular representation while they
are in Canada, consular officials may be in a conflict of interest since they are also interested in
maximizing the number of workers from their country who participate. Therefore, they too may
act to discipline or at least not to support workers who wish to assert their rights. As we shall
see, this issue has recently received much attention. 83
i.

Ontario

Historically, most provinces excluded agricultural workers from protective labour and
employment laws, including statutory collective bargaining schemes. Most of these exclusions
have been reversed, but not all. Ontario, like Alberta, still excludes farm workers from its labour
relations act. 84 Constitutional litigation in the Dunmore case required the Ontario government
to provide agricultural workers with protection against retaliation for engaging in associational
activities and to require agricultural employers to accept collective representations, but not to
engage in collective bargaining. In response, the Ontario government enacted the Agricultural
Employees Protection Act (AEPA). A subsequent round of litigation challenged this legislation
on the ground that this legislation did not go far enough and that unless the government
imposed a duty to bargain in good faith agricultural workers would be effectively unable to enjoy
collective bargaining. The Supreme Court of Canada rejected the claim, although it did read into
the AEPA a duty to consider collective representations in good faith. The result of all this
constitutional litigation is that while Ontario farm workers are legally free to unionize and
bargain collectively, the law does not provide the minimum support necessary for them to do so
Kerry Preibisch, “Pick-Your-Own Labor: Migrant Workers and Flexibility in Canadian Agriculture”
(2010) 44 Int’l Migration Rev. 404; Jill Hennebry, “Permanently Temporary? Agricultural Migrant
Workers and Their Integration in Canada” (IRPP Study No. 26, 2012).
84 S.O. 1995, Chapter 1, Schedule A, s. 3(b.1); Labour Relations Code, R.S.A. 2000, c. L-1, s. 4(e).
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in the face of employer recalcitrance. Therefore, collective bargaining for agricultural workers,
whether they be TFWs or persons with permanent status is not likely to occur. 85 However, the
lack of legal protection does not mean that workers cannot or will not act collectively. SAWs in
Ontario employed by two large greenhouse operations struck twice, in 2001 and 2003. They
were both one-day actions but in each case many of the participants were repatriated early. 86
Not surprisingly, there are no other reports of SAWs engaging in such activities.
ii.

Manitoba

Unlike in Ontario, farm workers in Manitoba are covered by the province’s basic collective
bargaining statute. This removes a major legal impediment, but leaves in place the migration
status precarity of TFWs, as well as the other obstacles to organizing arising that we mentioned
earlier. In this challenging environment, successes have been hard won and difficult to sustain,
as the only case of unionization in Manitoba demonstrates.
In 2006, employees of a Mayfair Farms just outside of Portage la Prairie applied for certification
of a bargaining unit which would consist predominantly of TFWs under the SAWP. The
application was opposed by the employer who advanced three arguments that are of particular
interest here: 1) that TFWs under the SAWP fell under federal, not provincial jurisdiction; 2)
that TFWs are not employees under the provincial labour relations statute; and 3) that Mayfair
Farms was not the employer. These arguments highlight many of the questions that arise when
mobile workers, especially TFWs, seek to form or join a collective bargaining regime. In its
decision, the Board allowed the application and certified the bargaining unit, addressing many
of the questions surrounding the ability of TFWs to unionize. 87
The initial jurisdictional argument points to uncertainty arising out of the cleft between
immigration law, a matter of federal jurisdiction which gives the federal government authority
to allow TFWs into the country as aliens, and labour relations, a matter of provincial
Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General) 2001 SCC 94; Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser 2011 SCC
20. For a discussion of the history of exclusion and the failure of constitutional litigation, see Eric Tucker,
“Farm Worker Exceptionalism: Past, Present, and the post-Fraser Future” in Fay Faraday, Judy Fudge
and Eric Tucker, eds., Constitutional Labour Rights in Canada: Farm Workers and the Fraser Case
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012), 30-56. On the situation of farm workers in Ontario more generally, see the
other chapters in that volume.
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jurisdiction. Following a review of cases and legislation, the Board found that the province does
indeed have jurisdiction to regulate labour relations of TFWs. It rejected the employer’s
position that because the contracts of workers in the SAWP are governed by a Memorandum of
Understanding between the Federal government and foreign governments their labour and
employment falls within federal jurisdiction. The board also flatly rejected the claim that aliens
are not covered by provincial laws.
The second argument considered was whether TFWs are “employees” for the purposes of The
Labour Relations Act. The employer pointed to the “peculiarities” of the TFW employment
relationship which differentiate TFWs from ordinary employees. One of these peculiarities is the
explicit impermanence of the employment relationship, which is limited to eight months at a
time with no guarantee that TFWs will return to work for that employer. The Board found that
Act allows for a broad definition of the term “employee” and that its application was not
restricted by immigration status. The other irregularity identified by the employer is the
inability of the employer or the employee to freely contract with one another; both parties sign a
standard employment agreement under the SAWP, the terms and conditions of which neither
party has the ability to affect. The employer’s argument was that the presence of the
employment contract removed any space for a meaningful collective bargaining process, in
contravention of the purpose of the act (which is to facilitate the practice of collective bargaining
between bargaining units and employers). In rejecting these arguments, the Board effectively
re-framed the SAWP employment contract not as an exhaustive enumeration of rights and
obligations, but rather as a “floor of rights” document which set out minimum protections for
TFWs. The Board found that the letter of the contract was often not enforced, at the behest of
the employer, and that TFWs were regularly working more than the hours set out in the contract
and not getting the days of rest to which they were entitled under that contract. Furthermore, a
stipulation in the employment contract which required TFWs to be paid the same wage as
Canadians in the same workplace allowed for meaningful benefits to be secured through
collective bargaining; the union could negotiate higher wages for the six Canadian employees
who would be members of the bargaining unit, thus improving wages for TFWs within the terms
of the employment contract. There were, in other words, meaningful gains within and beyond
the employment contract that could be secured through collective bargaining.
The employer’s third argument was that it was not, in fact, the employer of these workers for the
purposes of the Act. Here again the employer pointed to the role of the Canadian and Mexican
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governments in recruiting workers and forming the employment contract. After considering the
multi-factor test for who is the employer developed in the case law, the board rejected Mayfair’s
claim, finding that Mayfair exercised control, paid remuneration, imposed discipline, etc. As a
result, it was the employer for the purposes of the Act. Having signed up more that 65% of the
employees in the bargaining unit at the time the application was filed, the UFCW Local 328 was
certified as the bargaining agent in June 2007.
In summer 2008 a three-year collective agreement was successfully negotiated between the
union and Mayfair Farms. It marginally improved hourly rates and provided for overtime after
70 hours. In summer 2009, the workers voted unanimously to decertify the union as its
bargaining agent, and certification was subsequently revoked. Some workers expressed
dissatisfaction over the decision by the employer to reduce working hours to avoid overtime and
the amount of union dues relative to the increase in rates. Also, the decertification vote followed
a closed-door visit by the Mexican consulate, where it is alleged that Mexican officials warned
SAWP workers that they could be blacklisted from the program should they not choose to
decertify. There are also reports that workers are now warned not to interact with union
representatives or people associated with a union. We will return to the issue of the involvement
of consular officials in more detail in the context of our discussion of developments in British
Columbia, but since the decertification of the Mayfair bargaining unit there have been no other
successful unionization campaigns in Manitoba. 88

iii.

British Columbia

In August, 2008, following a slew of accidents involving farm machinery and transportation of
farm workers, including a vehicle crash that left a SAWP employee of Greenway Farms in Surrey
critically injured, the SAWs voted to be represented by UFCW Local 1518. 89 In 2009, the
employer, backed by several groups representing the interests of agricultural employers, applied
to cancel the certification, arguing that the BC Labour Relations Act did not apply to foreign
workers under the federally administered SAWP. While similar jurisdictional arguments against
certification were advanced as in Mayfair, there were additional arguments that warrant
Jodi Read, Sarah Zell and Lynne Fernandez, Migrant Voices: Stories of Agricultural Migrant Workers
in Manitoba (Winnipeg: CCPA, 2013), 21, 30-31 Online at
https://www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/Manitoba%20Office/2013/05
/Migrant%20Voices%20Report_0_0.pdf; “Canada: Unions and Migrants” (October 2009) 15:4 Rural
Migration News Online at http://migration.ucdavis.edu/rmn/more.php?id=1488_0_4_0.
89 Robert Russo, “Temporarily Unchained: The Drive to Unionize Foreign Seasonal Workers in Canada –
A Comment on Green Way Farms and UFCW” (2011) 169 BC Stud 131.
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consideration here. First, the standard SAWP contract is different in BC than in the rest of
Canada, and includes a provision which says it cannot be modified without the written
permission of employee, employer and the governments of Canada and Mexico. 90 Unlike in
Manitoba, where the employment contract was found to provide a non-exhaustive enumeration
of minimum rights, it was argued that the BC contract could not be subject to any such change.
Second, it was argued that the ability of SAWP workers to form a bargaining unit for the
purposes of negotiating in a particular workplace undermined the uniform, industry-wide
agreement contemplated under the program. 91
UFCW’s response to the first argument, which was accepted by the board, was that federal
intention to occupy a matter which would otherwise fall under provincial jurisdiction (that being
employment contracts) required clear statutory language pointing to that intention and that no
such intention was present here. 92 In response to the second argument, the union argued that
while there is no express statement within the SAWP employment contract or memoranda of
understanding that indicates the intention to import a uniform, industry-wide agreement, there
is clear language which says that SAWP workers are to be treated equally to Canadian workers.
This includes the ability of Canadian farm workers to unionize. The Board accepted this
argument as well, and in the end denied the employer’s application to cancel the certification. 93
While the decision in Greenway was heralded as a victory by UFCW and other groups working
towards organizing agricultural workers, 94 the after effects point to an inherent obstacle to
SAWP workers organizing or being incorporated into collective bargaining units. On the same
day that Greenway was released, the workers at Greenway filed to decertify the union. In the
growing season following the original certification, Greenway hired back significantly fewer
workers than is typically seen in the SAWP, implying that many of the pro-union workers were
not re-hired. 95 While UFCW complained of unfair labour practices to the Labour Relations
Board, the complaint was dismissed.

Greenway Farms Ltd. and United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1518
(2009) BCLRB No B135/2009 [‘Greenway’] at para 11.
91 Russo, supra note 75.
92 Greenway, supra note 67 at para 110.
93 Ibid at 132.
94 UFCW Canada, “Seasonal farm workers in B.C. go union with UFCW Canada” online:
<“http://www.ufcw.ca/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=593&catid=5&Itemid=99&lan
g=en>.
95 Russo, supra note 75
90

44

A second UFCW organizing campaign took place at Floralia farm in Abbotsford. 96 Shortly
before a certification vote was to be held, in September 2008 fourteen workers were laid off and
repatriated. The UFCW brought an unfair labour practice complaint before the Labour
Relations Board, but in October the Board found that the layoffs had been economically
justified. 97 Despite the repatriations, the remaining workers voted to be unionized and a
collective agreement between UFCW Local 118 and Floralia Farms was established almost a year
later, making this the first collective agreement in British Columbia to apply to SAWP workers. 98
However, as was the case with the Mayfair workers, a campaign to decertify the union was
launched. At this point, the Floralia story begins to merge with a third organizing campaign and
so we will turn our attention to the Sidhu & Sons Nursery (Sidhu) story.
There was also an organizing campaign at Sidhu in 2008 and the workers voted by a bare
majority in favour of being represented by the UFCW. Lengthy litigation followed on the
question of whether SAWs were an appropriate bargaining unit, given that the employer also
employed permanent Canadian residents. In November 2010, the BC Labour Relations Board
found that the unit was appropriate for collective bargaining on the grounds that the unique
employment relationship and interests of the SAWP workers were distinct enough from
domestic workers. However, in certifying the unit, the Board also restricted the scope of the
bargaining rights so that the union could only negotiate over matters which were unique to that
particular group. 99 A collective agreement was concluded, which contained provisions designed
to introduce the principle of seniority into the selection of workers to return the following
season, as well other arrangements related to the circular migration that is a feature of the
SAWP.
The following spring, in 2011, workers at both Sidhu and Floralia filed decertification
applications and a vote was conducted. However, the ballot boxes were sealed pending
adjudication of the union’s complaint that there had been employer and Mexican government
interference that prevented the workers from expressing their true wishes. In particular, the
union alleged that the Mexican government conspired with the employer to block the return of
For a fuller discussion the background to this case, see Leah F. Vosko, “National Sovereignty and
Transnational Labour: The Case of Mexican Seasonal Agricultural Workers in British Columbia, Canada”
(2013) 44 Industrial Relations Journal 514.
97 Ibid. See: Floralia Plant Growers Ltd. v. United Food and Commercial Workers International Union,
Local 118, (2008) BCLRB No B157/2008.
98 Russo, supra note 75.
99 Ibid. See: Sidhu & Sons Nursery Ltd. v. United Food and Commercial Workers International Union,
Local 1518, (2010) No. B26/2010 [Leave for Reconsideration denied in No. B64/2010].
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workers believed to be union supporters and that this created a climate of fear making it
impossible to ascertain whether the workers desired union representation. The Mexican
government responded by claiming sovereign immunity, meaning that it was not subject to the
jurisdiction of the BC Labour Board. In 2012 the board issued a decision which accepted the
government’s claim. However that did not end the matter since in principle the Mexican
government’s actions could still be scrutinized to determine whether it had tainted the
decertification application, even if no order could be issued against Mexico. As well, there was
still the union’s claim about employer interference. The board also split the Sidhu and Floralia
claims so that they would be considered separately. 100
In a subsequent hearing focused only on the Sidhu claim, the board heard testimony voluntarily
given by former employees of the Mexican consulate, but it ultimately decided that it could not
consider their evidence because of Mexican claims of diplomatic immunity. 101 That decision was
overturned in a Reconsideration decision, 102 which was then challenged in court. In a lengthy
judgment that focused on the scope of sovereign immunity the court upheld the board’s
Reconsideration decision. 103 Shortly thereafter the Board issued its judgment on the merits of
the union’s application dealing with whether the Mexican state and or the employer’s actions
prevented the workers from expressing the true wishes in the decertification election. Relying
heavily on the evidence of the former consular officials, the board found that senior Mexican
officials instructed consular officials to identify workers who contacted the union so that they
could be prevented from returning to Canada. It found they were motivated by a concern that
employers would stop requesting Mexican workers if they joined a union and that this would not
only adversely affect Mexican workers but that it would also result in the loss of employment for
people administering the SAWP. 104 While there was no evidence that Mexican officials or the
employer instigated the decertification application, the Board nevertheless concluded that the
impact of the action of Mexican officials in blocking the return of a worker who they believed
was pro-union created a climate of fear among the returning workers so that the vote would not
reflect their true wishes. As a result, the decertification application was dismissed without the
ballots being counted. Although this decision does not deal with the Floralia decertification
application, we can assume that it too will not be considered by the board.
Certain Employees of Sidhu & Sons Nursery Ltd. And Certain Employees of Floralia Plant Growers
Limited, BCLRB No. 28/2012.
101 BCLRB No. B194/2013.
102 BCLRB No. B54/2013.
103 United Mexican States v. British Columbia (Labour Relations Board) 2014 BCSC 54.
104 BCLRB No. B56/2014, para. 77. Leave for reconsideration denied, BCLRB No. B78/2014.
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In sum, although on the one hand the litigation was successful and two bargaining units of
SAWs remain, the experience in British Columbia highlights the enormous difficulty of
organizing SAWs under the Wagner Act model. The circular migration pattern makes SAWs
extremely vulnerable since their ability to return is in large measure contingent on their
employer inviting them back. Moreover, as this Sidhu case demonstrates, consular officials who
are supposed to enforce the protections contained in the bilateral agreements that are a feature
of the SAWP have a clear conflict of interest that was manifest in an extreme form here. As well,
it is a very resource intensive exercise, especially in an environment in which employers have a
long history of opposing unions. However, before concluding, we need to consider the
experience of organizing SAWs in Quebec, where there has been more success than in the rest of
Canada.
iv.

Quebec

Farmworkers in Quebec have been covered by the labour relations law since 1964. However,
there was one restriction. Farmworkers could not be certified unless at least three members of
the bargaining unit were “ordinarily and continuously” employed on the farm. 105 This effectively
precluded the organization of bargaining units comprised entirely of migrant workers, foreign or
domestic. However, it did leave the door open to organizing farmworkers in settings where
there was a small core of permanent employees and in these situations the UFCW Local 501 was
able to successfully organize a small number of greenhouse, field crop and agricultural packing
facilities. As of November 2009, it had organized seven bargaining units, three covering
migrant workers. 106
During its 2008 drive to organize SAWs the UFCW applied to represent a group of six SAWs
employed on a farm that did not have any permanent employees. The agent who was charged
with determining whether the conditions for certification were met refused to certify the union
because three workers were not continuously employed. The matter was referred to the
Commission for a hearing. Nearly two years later, in 2010, the Commission certified the union,
holding that the exclusion in the act violated the workers’ freedom of association and was
therefore inoperable. 107 The employer sought judicial review and finally in March 2013 the
Quebec Superior Court upheld the Commission’s ruling on the unconstitutionality of the
R.S.Q. c. C-27, s. 21.
L'Écuyer v. Côté, 2013 QCCS 973, para. 33.
107 Travailleurs et travailleuses unis de l'alimentation et du commerce, section locale 501 c. L'Écuyer, 2010
QCCRT 191.
105

106

47

exclusion. However, it suspended the declaration of invalidity for a year to give the government
an opportunity to draft new legislation. 108 In the summer, 2014, the government tabled a bill
that would apply to farms with less than three permanent employees. Instead of the normal
collective bargaining regime, employees in this setting would enjoy the right to form
associations and make representations about the conditions of employment of its members. The
employer is required to listen to verbal representations and read those made in writing.
According to the bill, “Diligence and good faith must govern the parties’ conduct at every stage
of discussions…” It would seem Quebec legislators were inspired by Ontario legislation, which
was interpreted and approved by the Supreme Court of Canada in its judgment in Fraser v.
Ontario (Attorney General). 109
While this has been celebrated as a victory, and it is, that should not obscure the larger picture,
which is that SAWs remain extremely vulnerable to retaliation given their dependence on their
employers and, in some cases, consular officials to stay in the circular migration flow.
Moreover, organizing farm by farm is a daunting task such that even after legal obstacles are
removed it is extremely unlikely that union density will even catch up with the low level of
private sector unionization that exists in most provinces. 110

3. Low Skill Workers
The creation and expansion of the low skill program has brought to Canada another group of
TFWs, some of whom are employed in agriculture, but most in other industrial sectors, many of
which are largely un-unionized. For example, after agricultural and caregivers, the four highest
categories of low-skill TFWs present in Canada in 2011 were: food service counter workers
(8150); light duty cleaners (1980); truck drivers (1700) and food and beverage servers (1115). 111
In most instances these workers will be working alongside permanent residents.
The presence of TFWs will potentially complicate an already difficult organizing environment.
Their lack of permanent status makes low-skill TFWs particularly vulnerable because unlike
other workers, if they lose their job they cannot enter the labour market like other unemployed
Supra., note 92.
Quebec, National Assembly, Bill 8 (2014), An Act to Amend the Labour Code with respect to certain
employees of farming businesses. 2011 SCC 20.
110 For a discussion of this larger problems, see Tucker, “Farm Worker Exceptionalism, supra.
111 Canada - Temporary Foreign Workers Present on Dec 1st with Occupational Skill Level C &D by
Occupation (4-digit NOC), 2002-2011 (Special run provided by Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Dec.
2012).
108
109

48

workers but must find employment with another employer who has gotten a favourable Labour
Market Opinion (LMO) and, therefore, is authorized to hire TFWs. This is not easy. 112 If they
are unable to find legal employment then effectively they are faced with the choice of working
illegally or leaving the country. As well, some TFWs hope to become permanent residents
through the Provincial Nominee Program. While the requirements of each program vary from
province to province, the program is essentially employer driven insofar as the TFW must be
employed by the legal employer for a certain amount of time and must also have an offer of
permanent employment from that employer. Loss of employment while the application is being
processed may result in the application being denied. Workers in this position will likely be very
cautious about engaging in activities that might displease their current employer.
Of course, the union has no control over whether TFWs are present in a non-union environment
and, therefore, must address the added challenges of organizing when they are present. The
union must decide whether to organize a bargaining unit consisting of all employees, including
both TFWs and permanent status workers, or to organize one of these groups separately from
the other (as in the Sidhu case in BC, where a separate unit of TFWs was organized). To a great
extent the union’s preference will be driven by strategic considerations, such as what unit the
union believes it can successfully organize and the strength of the resulting bargaining unit. But
those strategic choices have to be made within the legal framework governing the definition of
appropriate bargaining units. In particular, we want to know whether labour boards will allow
unions a choice in the matter or will insist that some configurations are appropriate while others
are not.
A recent decision of the Ontario Labour Relations Board, discussed earlier in relation to the
issue of who is the employer, addressed a situation in which a union, the International
Association of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental and Reinforcing Ironworkers, Local 721 applied to
represent a group of 160 workers employed by CS Wind Canada Inc. However, in their
application the union sought to exclude a group of about 31 Vietnamese nationals, hired by CS
Wind Vietnam, who were working in Canada as TFWs pursuant to an intra-company transfer

For example, a newspaper reported that two TFWs hired by a non-union employer in British Columbia
claimed they were fired for speaking to a union representative. A complaint was filed with the BC labour
board. In the meantime, the union is trying to find them legal work with an Alberta employer. If no work
is found, they may have to return home before the complaint is heard. Frank Luba, “Irish Steelworkers
Get Labour Board Meeting after Firing Leaves Them Stranded in B.C.” The Province (19 February 2014).
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program. 113 Although the case does not specify under which branch of the TFW program they
worked, from the description it seems these were high, not low, skill workers. Nevertheless, the
principles articulated in that case should apply to workers in the low-skill category.
The Board first set out the general principle of bargaining unit determination that it has
developed in previous cases:
It is not a question of what bargaining unit would be the most appropriate nor whether
the employer’s or the union’s preferred bargaining unit is the more appropriate one.
Rather, the Board’s task is to determine whether the unit sought by the Union is an
appropriate unit such that it will be appropriate for collective bargaining and is not likely
to cause serious labour relations problems for the employer (para. 115).
In this case the employer objected to the exclusion of the TFWs on the basis that it would cause
them serious industrial relations difficulties and that their exclusion from this bargaining unit
would make it extremely difficult for the TFWs to access collective bargaining. On the latter,
point, the board was incredulous that the employer was deeply concerned about the ability of
TFWs to access collective bargaining and, in any event, thought that a group of 30 workers could
be organized separately if they wished to do so (paras. 146-47). The board gave greater
consideration to the labour relations problems raised by the employer, but noted that it was the
employer’s choice to create a “fractured workforce” (para. 127) in which there was a group of
permanent domestic workers and TFWs doing essentially the same work, but who were
governed by different rules, partly the result of government regulation of TFWs and partly the
result of the fact that the TFWs terms and conditions of employment were, to a great extent,
established by their contracts with CS Wind Vietnam. In the board’s view, labour relations
problems would result whether the TFWs were in or out of the bargaining unit.
The general principle adopted in the CS Wind case gives the union substantial leeway in
determining whether to organize units consisting exclusively of domestic permanent workers or
of TFWs, or of organizing a consolidated unit, subject to the ability of the employer to
demonstrate that the proposed unit would create serious labour relations issues. If other boards
follow the approach taken here that will be difficult to do, since it will be open to the union to
113 International Association of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental and Reinforcing Ironworkers, Local 721
v CS Wind Canada Inc, 2014 CanLII 14887 (ON LRB), <http://canlii.ca/t/g6d7f> retrieved on 2014-0428
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argue that the labour relations difficulties stem from the employers decision to have TFWs in the
workplace and that there will be problems regardless of the bargaining unit configuration.
With that in mind, we turn our attention to the only case study we only know of examining an
organizing drive to unionize a joint TFW-permanent resident bargaining unit. The study, by
Jason Foster and Bob Barnetson, examined an organizing drive by the Service Employees
International Union (SEIU) among Bee-Clean Maintenance workers at the University of Alberta
(UofA) campus in Edmonton. 114 The campaign followed the Justice for Janitors (J4J) model,
developed in California which combines grassroots activism and the targeting of the firms that
contract with the janitorial service provider, in this case the UofA. TFWs comprised a
significant portion of the targeted bargaining unit. Many of the workers were dissatisfied
because they were working unpaid overtime and required to perform uncompensated personal
services for supervisors. SEIU assisted the workers in filing claims for unpaid wages and an
unfair labour practices complaint was filed alleging that Bee-Clean had terminated an employee
for joining the union and for threats and intimidation. A solidarity committee was formed
consisting of UofA faculty and students and political activists in the city. The workers’ claim for
unpaid wages was successful. The adverse publicity and pressure led Bee-Clean to begin
negotiating a resolution which led to it voluntarily recognizing the union and negotiating a
collective agreement that made specific provision for transparency in TFW renewals and
extended leaves of absence so that workers could visit family members in the home countries.
In their examination of the campaign, Foster and Barnetson point to the embarrassment that
was caused to the employer and the UofA by the mistreatment of TFWs, in a context in which
the public had already been sensitized to the issue. However, they also point out that the
adverse publicity surrounding Bee Clean’s violations of employment standards will make it
ineligible to obtain future authorizations to procure TFWs, the effect of which will be to prevent
TFWs whose time in Canada is ending from being replaced by other TFWs. In other words, it
will lead to a bargaining unit with no TFWs. As Foster and Barnetson point out, “[t]he irony for
the TFWs is that their real and perceived vulnerability was a key factor in the success of the
campaign but also reduced their ability to benefit from unionization.” 115

114 Jason Foster and Bob Barnetson, “Justice for Janitors in Alberta: The Impact of Temporary Foreign
Workers on an Organizing Campaign” (2012) 16 J. Workplace Rights 3.
115 Ibid, 23.
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More research is needed on the experience of organizing low-skill TFWs outside of agriculture
(if there is experience) in order to draw firm conclusions, but we hypothesize that their presence
in unorganized workplaces, in industries that are largely non-union, will only complicate
matters. The presence of TFWs may create or exacerbate internal divisions with the workplace,
especially where TFWs are assigned different and perhaps less desirable work than permanent
residents. As well, as we have noted, TFWs are a vulnerable group who might be particularly
reluctant to stick out their necks. Finally, even if an organizing drive is successful, its impact on
the situation of TFWs is uncertain.

B. Incorporating TFWs into Unionized Workplaces
When TFWs are hired into unionized workplaces, they become members of the bargaining unit.
So the focus here is on how collective agreements address the different needs of TFWs. This is
not a subject about which there is much research. In the previous section, we saw that collective
agreements for newly organized bargaining units with TFWs did contain some provisions
addressing their particular needs, especially around the renewal process. But in most cases, the
fragility of the collective bargaining relationship precluded any real examination of how well
these measures worked.
The one example of TFW incorporation into an existing bargaining unit that has been widely
publicized is at the Maple Leaf Foods (MLF) hog processing plant in Brandon, Manitoba. The
history of the transformation of meat packing from a relatively high-wage and densely unionized
industry to a low-wage, low union density industry is emblematic of the industrial restructuring
common in Canada. 116 Maple Leaf opened a large processing plant in Brandon in 1999,
employing about 1,000 workers. The plant was unionized from the outset but the collective
agreement with UFCW, Local 832 reflected the weak state of unions in the industry. Hourly
wages for unskilled workers started at $8.25 and for skilled workers at $11. The combination of
low wages and poor working conditions resulted in high rates of worker turnover and
absenteeism. Wage increases and incentives did not solve the recruitment and retention
problems, which became urgent when MLF decided to add a second shift in 2003, more than
doubling the workforce when fully implemented. When recruiting efforts in the Maritimes
failed to produce enough workers, MLF began turning overseas, initially recruiting workers from
116 Charlotte Yates and Belinda Leach, “Industrial Work in a Post-Industrial Age” in Vivian Shalla and
Wallace Clement, eds., Work in Tumultuous Times (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007),
163.
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Mexico and El Salvador, and then expanding its efforts to other countries including China,
Guatemala, Ukraine and the Philippines. Between 2004 and 2009, 1,700 foreign workers were
hired, the majority of whom came as TFWs, so that TFWs comprised the majority of the
Brandon plant’s workforce. Of course, their TFW status tied these workers to the workplace
since to leave their jobs would result in a loss of the right to work and, practically speaking, stay
in Canada. But MLF did not depend exclusively on the restricted work permit to retain their
TFWs. They recruited TFWs from countries that were poor and often in turmoil and so these
workers were more willing to put up with what are by Canadian standards low-paying and
arduous jobs because of their desperation. More positively, MLF also engaged in efforts to
facilitate settlement into the community and has been supportive of TFW employees securing
permanent immigration status through the Provincial Nomination Program (PNP), which
enables those who are nominated and accepted to acquire permanent status on an expedited
basis. In Manitoba, unlike some other provinces, the PNP program is open to low-skill TFWs. In
order to qualify, TFWs must work six months with the employer named in the work permit and
obtain a formal offer of full-time employment in a permanent job. As a result, the turnover rate
has been reduced to ten percent. 117
Clearly, the decision to obtain workers through the TFW program was made by MLF, rather
than the union. The role of the UFCW in the implementation of this decision is not as well
documented. There is some indication the union was involved in the decision to open up the
PNP to MLF TFWs. In 2009 the union and MLF signed a new five-year collective agreement
which contained specific provisions to address the needs of TFWs. This included imposing a
duty on the employer to process the paperwork for the PNP, to provide translators when
required by foreign workers, and to translate the collective agreement and the employee
handbook into any language when this was the first language for 100 workers or more. As well,
an expedited arbitration process is provided for TFWs if they have been terminated so that their
cases can be heard before they are forced to leave. In addition to negotiating collective
agreement provisions, the union also provides other services, including English language classes
Jowett, “Rules of Disengagement: ‘Low Skill’, Migrant Workers, Law, and the Social Dimensions of
Exclusionary Inclusion” (LLM, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 2014), 95-98; Delphine
Nakache and Sarah D’Aoust, “Provincial/Territorial Nominee Programs: An Avenue to Permanent
Residency for Low-Skilled Temporary Foreign Workers?” in Patti Tamara Lenard and Christine Straelhle,
eds., Legislated Inequality: Temporary Labour Migration in Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 2012) 158.; Economic Development Brandon, “Maple Leaf Overview,” Online
http://www.economicdevelopmentbrandon.com/maple-leaf; Renewing Immigration: Towards a
Convergence and Consolidation of Canada’s Immigration Policies and Systems (Conference Board of
Canada, October 2008), 30-34).
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that help TFWs become better integrated and enable them to obtain the language proficiency
necessary to become permanent residents under the PNP. 118
Nahveen Mehta, the General Counsel and Director of human rights, equity and diversity for
UFCW Canada, emphasizes the importance of unionization for protecting TFWs. “The
difference between a unionized and a non-unionized Temporary Foreign Worker is like the
difference between the sky and the ground. Or more accurately, the sky and a mine pit.” 119
But not all discussions of the MLF experience are so positive. For example, some critics have
pointed to the fact that the ability of employers to access foreign workers enabled them to
expand their workforces without having to improve conditions to a level that would have
attracted workers in Canada with permanent status. 120 However, our focus here is on the
integration of TFWs into the collective bargaining regime, and there seems to be little doubt that
in the MLF case not only has the presence of the union strengthened the position of TFWs, but
that the process of integrating TFWs into the bargaining unit and the collective bargaining
regime has gone relatively smoothly. For example, while one of the TFWs at MLF that Jowett
interviewed expressed some dissatisfaction with the amount of material the union had
translated into Spanish, he also expressed confidence that he could turn to the union for support
in enforcing his rights. 121
It is unknown whether unions in other settings where TFWs have been introduced have been
similarly successful. For example, TFWs were also brought into the unionized Maple Leaf
poultry plant in Edmonton, Alberta. In 2008 the union struck, with the support of 80 of the 98
TFWs employed there. The union claimed that TFWs were being used to maintain an artificially
118 “UFCW Canada Local 832 Negotiates Landmark Protections for Migrant Worker Members,” Online
http://www.ufcw.ca/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=674&Itemid=6&lang=en; “Local
832 Builds Bonds with Migrant Workers,” Online
http://www.ufcw.ca/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2334:local-832-builds-bondswith-migrant-workers&Itemid=6&lang=en; CBC News, “Hog Workers Approve Contract that Aids
Foreign Workers” (5 Jan. 2010), Online http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/hog-workersapprove-contract-that-aids-foreign-workers-1.945076. UFCW also has negotiated contract language
facilitating the transition of TFWs into PNPs at other Manitoba employers, including Cargill, HyLife
Foods and Olymel. See
http://www.ufcw.ca/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4073:canada-s-largest-foodworkers-union-says-kenney-alexander-announcement-re-temporary-foreign-workers-fails-to-fix-brokensystem&catid=544&Itemid=6&lang=en.
119 Interview with Brendan Jowett (18 June 2013) from Jowett, “Rules of Disengagement,” 110.
120 Critical voices are heard in Sheldon Birnie, “Maple Leaf Foods: A Revealing Look into How Immigrant
Labour Helps Big Business Keep Wages Low and Working Conditions Down” (1 March 2012), Online
http://www.cireport.ca/2012/03/maple-leaf-foods-a-revealing-look-into-how-immigrant-labour-helpsbig-business-keep-wages-low-and-working-conditions-down.html
121 Jowett, “Rules of Disengagement,” 117.
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low wage in the plant and that MLF had not kept promises it made to TFWs at the time they
were recruited. The striking TFWs were in a particularly difficult position because they were
unable to secure other work without new permits and were seeking help from a community legal
clinic. 122

VI.

Conclusion
This report provides an overview of the challenges mobile workers face becoming incorporated
into the collective bargaining regime. These challenges arise in the first instance from the most
basic structures of the regime. We start with a world in which individual bargaining is the
default and in which workers must opt into the collective bargaining regime. Because we
operate on the basis of representational rather than regulatory unionism, unions can only
bargain terms and conditions that apply to the workers in bargaining units they represent.
Moreover, for the most part the geographic scale of representational unionism in Canada is
local. Provincial jurisdiction over labour relations, except in federally regulated sectors
(covering about 10% of the labour force) prevents unions from requiring employers to bargain
agreements that are national in scope. Furthermore, province-wide bargaining is exceptional as
most bargaining units are limited to all workers of a single employer in a municipality. Finally,
to gain bargaining rights, unions must win majority support within a bargaining unit, and in
recent years there has been a shift toward requiring that support to be demonstrated in an
election, which research demonstrates decreases the likelihood of union success compared to
the card-count method that used to predominate.
These structures affect geographically mobile workers in several ways. First, to the extent that
this structure reduces union density, it is more likely that mobile workers will leave a non-union
workplace and move to a non-union workplace, making their incorporation into the collective
bargaining regime more difficult. Even if they start in a unionized workplace, lower union
densities make it more likely that they will move to a non-union workplace that will have to be
unionized for them to re-enter the collective bargaining regime. And finally, even if they move
from one unionized workplace to another, there will be many and often insurmountable
obstacles to transferring their accumulated seniority.

122 “Abuse of Temporary Foreign Workers Underlies Labour Dispute” (7 October 2008) Online
http://oilsandstruth.org/abuse-temporary-foreign-workers-underlies-labour-dispute; “Foreign Workers
at Striking Edmonton Plant Seek New Work Permits,” (21 October 2008) Online
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/foreign-workers-at-striking-edmonton-plant-seek-newwork-permits-1.757990.
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When we examined the processes for incorporating or re-incorporating workers into the
collective bargaining regime within the Canadian collective bargaining regime, we identified
some particular issues that might face mobile workers. For the purposes of this analysis,
however, we examined TFWs as a separate category because of their migration status
vulnerability. Among workers with permanent status, we examined problems that might arise
with respect to their categorization as employees and in regard to the identification of who is the
employer for the purposes of collective bargaining. However, we need to know more from field
workers about the extent of this problem and the precise forms that it takes before drawing any
conclusions or offering more specific advice. We also considered whether mobile workers
encounter greater difficulty organizing unions and winning certification than other workers.
Again, this is a topic that requires further field research.
When mobile workers move into unionized workplaces, they become members of the bargaining
unit and access union representation. This is known as accretion and seems fairly
straightforward and unproblematic, although again we would be interested in knowing from
fieldwork whether geographically mobile workers have experienced difficulty in this regard.
More problematic is whether unionized workers can carry over seniority when they move from
one bargaining unit to another. Since this is most commonly governed by inter- or intra-union
agreements and the provisions of collective bargaining agreements, and the issue only crops up
occasionally in the reported case law (often as a complaint by a bargaining unit member that the
union failed in its duty of fair representation) we can only offer a basic overview, without being
able to estimate the prevalence of such arrangements or comment on their operation. Again,
these are questions that can only be addressed after extensive fieldwork. However, we know
that these arrangements are more common in the construction industry, where mobility is the
norm, and so we have also provided a more detailed account of the kinds of arrangements found
there. But again, fieldwork is necessary to get a better handle on how these arrangements work
in particular contexts.
Finally, we turned our attention to the situation of temporary foreign workers. Here again we
have had to sub-divide the topic to reflect the diversity of programs through which temporary
workers enter Canada. We have not attempted to be comprehensive, nor have we tried to
describe these programs in detail since that would require a very lengthy treatment and has
been done elsewhere by others. Instead, we focused on a smaller selection of programs where
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collective bargaining issues have arisen, primarily in relation to organizing bargaining units
comprised solely or including a significant number of TFWs. Here we have found that their
vulnerability is multi-layered, combining their insecure immigration status, language and
cultural barriers, lack of knowledge of their legal rights, and a strong incentive to tolerate
violations in order to maximize their earnings during the window of opportunity that is open to
them. As well, they are often working in industries where there are substantial obstacles to
unionization, even for workers with permanent status.
As we noted, this report is intended for researchers in the field. We hope that it provides them
with enough information so that they are more aware of some issues they may encounter and we
look forward to the opportunity to learn from their research and further develop the analysis
begun here.
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Appendix 1
Questions for Field Research
1. Do geographically mobile workers confront a problem of being
categorized by their employers as independent contractors?
2. Do geographically mobile workers have difficult identifying who is the
employer or in identifying a legal entity that can be held legally
responsible for the obligations of the employer?
3. Do geographically mobile workers experience particular difficulties
when organizing a non-union workplace?
4. Do geographically mobile workers experience particular difficulties
being integrated into existing bargaining units?
5. What are the specific collective bargaining needs of geographically
mobile workers who are covered by collective agreements (e.g.,
housing and commuting allowances)?
6. Have you identified provisions in collective bargaining agreements
that address those specific needs?
7. Have you identified provisions in union constitutions and by-laws or
in inter-union agreements designed to accommodate geographically
mobile workers?
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